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(i) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of an empirical investigation into the effects of 
firms' dividend policies on the prices of and returns realised on their 
ordinary shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. A review of 
published theories as to whether the dividend policy of a firm ought to 
/ affect its value revealed that, under conditions approximating perfect 
capital markets, no dividend influence should be expected. Because of 
the wide range of market imperfections and their non uniform effect in 
the preferences they create amongst shareholders no consensus as to their 
aggregate influence on security returns exists. The writer's review of 
studies conducted by other researchers on overseas markets indicated no 
dividend effect. 
The main empirical investigation conducted by the writer into the effects 
of dividend policy on the value of a firm made use of cross sectional 
regression techniques and an expanded ex post form of the capital asset 
pricing model. The results of this test indicated a negative dividend 
preference by investors which is more likely to have resulted from the 
heavier taxation of dividends than capital gains, than from a dividend 
aversion in a perfect capital markets situation. 
The implication of these findings is that investors experiencing heavier 
taxation on dividend income than on capital gains may generally ignore 
the dividend policies of prospective investees, while all other investors 
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(ii) 
stand to gain by biasing their investment selection toward high payout 
shar~s. In favouring certain payout ratios adequate regard must, 
however, be given to maintaining an adequately diversified portfolio. 
The test results further imply that firms may increase their value by 
reducing the dividend payout and accordingly, with capital requirements 
met from internal sources, reducing the amount of new capital. raised 
through equity issues. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis consists of an empirical investigation into the effects of 
dividend policy on the value of and the return realized on ordinary 
shares of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Previous 
studies by Friend and Puckett (1), Black and Scholes (2) and Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (3), yielding conflicting results, have been confined to 
American equity markets. The writer is unaware of any published works 
documenting similar tests carried out locally, although a review of the 
dividend setting process in South Africa has been conducted by Seneque 
and Gourley (4). Furthermore, work on the information content of 
dividend announcements of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
has been performed by Knight and Affleck-Graves (5). 
The empirical technique employed in the main investigation of this thesis 
involves the use of cross sectional regression techniques using an 
expanded form of the capital asset pricing model (6). This approach is 
similar to that taken by the latter two American Studies. 
Current research in this area is conducted within the framework of a now 
generally accepted dividend irrelevance theory under conditions of 
perfect capital markets proposed by Miller and Modigliani (7). Noted 
dividend effects are therefore more likely to have arisen from market 
imperfections, particularly the difference in the effective rates of 
taxation levied on dividend income and capital gains, than from a 
dividend influence in a perfect capital markets situation. 
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The question of the influence of dividend policy on the value of a firm 
has wide economic significance. This influence is possibly most keenly 
felt by financial managers and investors. Financial managers may be 
faced with the decision of the maintenance of a regular dividend stream 
or a number of profitable investment opportunities, complicated by the 
availability of relatively more expensive external equity financing 
permitting both these options. New equity issues are more expensive than 
retained earnings since there may be significant costs associated with 
the former. The use of the more expensive financing or the compromising 
of investment plans to satisfy an incorrectly perceived dividend 
preference can negatively affect the value of the firm as could the non 
fulfilment of a genuine dividend preference. 
For investors the impact of the dividend policies of prospective 
investees on the selection of investments requires consideration. A 
genuine dividend preference may lead to shares in firms distributing a 
low proportion of earnings being bid up in the hope of a change in 
dividend policy. While the established irrelevance of dividend policy 
would focus investors' attention on other factors such as the 
profitability of investees investments and the quality of their 
management. Indeed Black and Scholes contend that in the absence of 
sophisticated selection. procedures attempts to bias portfolios toward 
either high or low yield stocks may lead to sub optimal portfolio 
diversification (8). 
At this stage it may be well to stat.e the problem to be addressed in this 
study. The hypothesis being tested is that the dividend policy of a firm 
affects the market value of, and the return. realised on, its equity 
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against the alternative hypothesis that the dividend policy does not 
affect the market value of, and the return realized on, the equity of a 
firm. It is necessary to include both market value and realized return 
in the statement of the problem. This is done to exclude from the 
discussion two otherwise identical firms, one following a generous 
dividend policy and the other a low payout policy. In the absence of any 
dividend influence, the returns realised on the shares of these two firms 
would be the same but the per share price would differ reflecting the 
undistributed profits retained by the low payout firm. 
A further case where dividend policy affects the share price and realized 
return in a different way is the case in which the level of dividend 
distribution is postulated to affect the value of a firm and where each 
dividend level is associated with a particular value. During periods 
where no change in dividend policy occurs the return realized will be 
influenced by non dividend factors only and therefore, for that period, 
no difference in the return on shares of otherwise identical high and low 
payout firms will be observed. 
For the purposes of this study dividend policy is defined as the decision 
to distribute a certain proportion of a firm's earnings such that the 
investment decisions are not influenced by the amount to be paid in 
dividends. This envisages a situation where management make independent 
decisions regarding the amount of funds to be appropriated for investment 
and dividend requirements, with shortfalls to be raised through share 
issues from time to time. It may be argued that in South Africa a forced 
association between the investment and· dividend decisions arises where 
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the inf low of cash exceeds that which is required for these two uses of 
funds. In this situation the decision not to distribute surplus cash 
results in that money being retained and automatically reinvested. This 
situation differs from that prevailing iri the United States where firms 
are permitted to utilize surplus cash resources to repurchase their 
shares. The repurchase results in a receipt by shareholders which may be 
classified as a capital gain for tax purposes, with the transaction 
viewed as a negative share issue. 
This balancing of cash flow through the use of external equity financing 
is not an annual procedure but is used intermittently to attain a desired 
long term capital structure. It may therefore be argued that firms with 
surplus cash flow will resort less to external equity financing, thus 
balancing their cash flow over a longer period while maintaining their 
desired dividend and investment plans. 
The empirical relationship between the investment and dividend decisions 
is discussed in Chapter Six. 
Apart from testing the impact of dividend policy on the value of a firm 
this thesis fits squarely within the broader problem of ascertaining 
whether financing decisions in general affect the value of a firm firstly 
under conditions of perfect capital markets and secondly upon the 
introduction of market imperfections such as taxes and transaction 
costs. It is therefore possible that the results of this thesis may 
provide corroborative evidence in these other areas of concern in 
finance. 
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The tests and the discussion documented in this thesis are directed at 
ascertaining whether the level of dividend payout influences the value of 
a firm and if so in which direction. Should an effect be noted this 
thesis will not address the problem of an optimal dividend policy or the 
interrelationship between the dividend decision and other decisions 
critical to the value of a firm. These problems would obviously be of 
great practical interest. The empirical techniques necessary to identify 
such an optimal payout would be vastly more complex than those used in 
this study but would provide a fascinating field for research. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two 
introduces necessary background for subsequent discussion and tests. 
Theories covering the operation of capital markets and the pricing of 
assets in such markets are considered together with the empirical 
difficulties associated with tests of such theories. 
\ 
Chapter Three 
considers arguments proposed by a number of writers as to whether 
dividend policy ought to affect the value of a firm. The position both 
with and without various market imperfections is discussed. Chapter Four 
reviews the more important research by other writers into the problem 
addressed in this study. Chapter Five documents a preliminary empirical 
study undertaken by the writer into the effects of dividend policy on the 
value of a firm. Chapter Six records a further investigation using cross 
sectional regression techniques. This approach circumvents certain 
conceptual limitations of the approach used in the first test. Chapter 
Seven concludes the thesis with a discussion of the implications of the 
test results for both investors and financial managers. 
L__ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This Chapter provides the theoretical background necessary to undertake 
the empirical study documented in Chapter Six. It also introduces 
criticism concerning the proposed methodology as well as a defence which 
justifies its use in this thesis. 
2.1 PORTFOLIO THEORY 
Portfolio theory dictates that in almost all cases investors seeking to 
maximize their wealth and minimize their risk will hold a combination of 
assets rather than a single asset. The reason for this is that an 
investor holding a single asset may almost always increase his expected 
return or decrease his expected risk by diversifying his investment. The 
benefits of diversification arise from imperfect co-movement of the 
expected returns on securities. Stated differently, changes in the 
expected returns on a particular share may be partly offset by 
unassociated variances in the returns of other shares in the portfolio. 
The reduction in the level of risk achieved by adding a security to a 
portfolio depends on the direction of variability of expected return on 
that share relative to others in the portfolio. The degree of 
co-movement is expressed by the co-variance of returns between two 
securities. The use of this phenomenon allows the construction of what 
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are known as efficient portfolios where the expected return on a 
portfolio is maximized for a given risk level or where the risk level is 
minimized for a given return. Investors are therefore able to construct 
portfolios to meet their risk and return preferences. As portfolio 
construction is undertaken on the basis of expected risk and return 
levels it should be stressed that a portfolio may be perceived as 
efficient from an anticipatory (ex ante) perspective, while an after the 
fact (ex post) evaluation of performance may show it to be sub-optimal. 
2.2 THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a model for the pricing of 
assets as components of efficient portfolios( 1). In oth,er words it 
suggests a return on an asset commensurate with that portion of its risk 
which is unavoidable through diversification in an efficient portfolio. 
The CAPM is, inter alia, directly based on the following assumptions: 
(i) Investors are risk averse individuals who seek to maximize their 
wealth at the end of each period, 
(ii) Investors have homogeneous expectations about asset returns which 
have a joint normal distribution, 
(iii) There exists a risk free rate such that investors may borrow or 
lend unlimited amounts at that rate, 
(iv) The quantities of assets are fixed (2). 
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Other necessary conditions are introduced below. 
While these conditions are unlikely to be exactly met it seems that they 
are sufficiently close to reality to allow the operation of the model. 
In its ex ante form the CAPM may be specified as follows: 
Where: E(Rit) = The expected return on share i during period t, 
E(Rmt) The expected return on the market during period t, 
Rf = The risk free rate of interest, 
l3i The beta of share i, defined as the covariance between 
the return on share i and the market return divided by 
the variance of the return on the market, 
[Cov(Ri,Rm)/Var(Rm)J. 
Briefly in intuitive terms the CAPM values assets at the risk free rate 
plus a premium commensurate with its risk. The price of risk is the 
difference between the expected market return and the risk free rate 
[E (Rm)-Rf] and the quantity of risk is given by 13 which is a measure of 
the shares sensitivity to changes in the return on the market. The CAPM 
again in its ex ante form may be plotted as the security market line as 
shown in Figure 2.1 
Expected 
Return 
~ 10 -
FIGURE 2.1 
Pm=l 
Beta 
The point plotted represents the expected return on the market which 
would have a beta of 1. From an ex ante perspective all securities must 
plot along the security market line. 
2.3 PERFECT AND EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS 
At this stage it would be convenient to introduce the concept of a 
perfect capital market which is characterised by the following 
conditions: 
(i) Markets are frictionless in that there are no transaction costs or 
taxes and that all assets are perfectly divisible and marketable. 
Furthermore no regulations exist which constrain trading on that 
market. 
(ii) There is perfect competition in product and securities markets. 
In product markets this means that all producers supply goods and 
services at minimum average cost, and in securities markets it 
means that all participants are price takers. 
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(iii) Markets are informationally efficient in that information is 
costless and is received simultaneously by all individuals. 
(iv) All investors are rational and seek to maximize their expected 
utility --(3). 
In view of these conditions few markets can be expected to be perfect. 
The less restrictive notion of an efficient capital market where security 
prices fully and instantaneously reflect all relevant price sensitive 
information allows the concept of a perfect capital market to be 
operationalized. The concept .of an efficient capital market is less 
demanding in that it permits market imperfections and costly information 
but restricts the pricing inefficiencies resulting from these factors to 
the approximate amount of the tax or transaction cost or the cost of 
obtaining, processing and acting on restricted information. Monopolies 
and other factors inhibiting free trading are also permitted but the 
value of the resultant advantages and disadvantages accruing to various 
firms are required to be fully and instantaneously reflected in the 
prices of those firms' securities. 
Copeland and Weston divide capital market efficiency into allocational 
and operational efficiency (4). Allocational efficiency is achieved 
where the risk adjusted marginal rates of return for borrowers and 
lenders are equated. Where this occurs the market has rationed capital 
by means of an equilibrium interest rate and has allocated the available 
funds such that the most profitable investment projects are undertaken. 
Operational efficiency results where the allocation of funds from lenders 
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to borrowers is achieved by market agents with the lowest possible 
transaction costs. 
Three forms of informational market efficiency have been proposed by Fama 
while relating this hypothesis to actual trading conditions (5). These 
are: 
(i) Weak form efficiency. In this situation it is proposed that no 
investor is able to earn returns consistently superior to those 
available on the market portfolio through basing investment 
decisions on historical price data. 
(ii) Semistrong form efficiency. In this situation it is proposed that 
no investor is able to earn returns consistently superior to those 
available on the market portfolio through basing investment 
decisions on either historical price data or other publicly 
available information. 
(iii) Strong form efficiency. In this situation it is proposed that 
irrespective of what information any investor has access to he is 
unable to earn returns consistently superior to those available on 
the market. 
The concept of an efficient capital market introduced in this 
section has significant implications for the construction of 
efficient portfolios and for the CAPM. 
- 13 -
2.4 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
tn an efficient capital market prices of assets have incorporated all 
relevant price sensitive information. Asset prices are therefore good 
predictors of value. This is of significance when the construction of 
truly efficient portfolios is considered, since any price sensitive 
information not reflected in asset prices implies a disequilibrium in the 
return on individual assets and inefficient portfolio construction. The 
compiling of portfolios would be inefficient because investors' 
expectations concerning the return on individual shares and the 
covariance of returns between shares would be incorrect because the full 
information set would not be available to them. To extend this line of 
reasoning if it is assumed that investors. act so as to maximize their 
return and minimize their variance of retnt'n they will construct 
portfolios which are efficient relative to the information set which is 
available to them. As the market portfolio is the sum of all individual 
investors' portfolios any. inefficiency in the latter, arising from 
inefficient c<lpital markets, is reflected in the market portfolio. 
Consequently the return on the market portfolio would not ceflect the 
current true complete information set. 
As noted the CAPM prices assets at the risk free rate of return plus a 
premium commensurate with that portion of its risk which is unavoidable 
through diversification. Understandably this risk premium is the product 
of the price of risk and the quantity of risk. The price of risk is 
given by the term [E(Rm)-Rf], being the difference between the expected 
market return and the risk free rate during i:lllY period. Asset prices 
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suggested by the CAPM are therefore influenced by the expected return on 
the market. Consequently should the capital market be inefficient the 
expected returns predicted by the CAPM would be incorrect because the 
expected return on the market would be distorted relative to the true 
information set. 
Beaver has, however, presented a further definition of an efficient 
market where, stated in a non rigorous form, a market is said to be 
efficient in respect to certain information if security prices behave as 
if that information is incorporated into prices (6). Beaver notes a 
number of situations outlined in research papers of earlier writers which 
may give rise to thts position. Among them is a paper by Grossman which 
considers a universe of uninformed investors, each in possession of 
partially correct information (7). The incorrect portions of investors' 
information sets tend to be uncorrelated and therefore approximately sum 
to zero over the market. The final result is security market prices 
which are better predictors of value than the assessment of any 
individual. The extension of inefficiencies in investor portfolios 
(these may, however, be eliminated by investors recognising market prices 
as optimal predictors of security values) to such inefficiencies in the 
market portfolio may therefore not be justified. 
This form of market efficiency has certain attractive attributes (8). 
The most significant of these are firstly that heterogeneous beliefs and 
information sets amongst investors are permitted. Secondly markets may 
be viewed as efficient with respect to specific information sets which 
avoids the arbitrarily determined forms of efficiency outlined in the 
previous section. 
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Subject to Beaver's argument the relative efficiency of a capital market 
is a necessary condition for the efficiency of the market portfolio which 
in turn must be seen as a joint hypothesis with the CAPM. The 
prerequisites for a perfect capital market, suitably relaxed such that 
they imply an efficient capital market, must therefore be added to the 
assumptions on which the CAPM is based. 
2.5 THE EMPIRICAL MARKET LINE 
The discussion thus far has considered the CAPM only in its anticipatory 
(ex ante) form. To permit empirical testing it requires restating so 
that actual data rather than expected values may be used. In its ex post 
form, which is derived from the ex ante form, it is known as the 
empirical market line. The transformation from the ex ante to the ex 
post form requires that the returns on a security are normally 
distributed and follow a fair game, which requires that over a large 
number of observations actual and expected values coincide. The 
empirical market line may be written as: 
(2.1) 
Where Rit = The return on share i during period t, 
Yot• Y1t Respectively the estimated intercept and slope of 
the empirical market line, 
Pi = The beta of share i, 
Eit A residual term. 
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It is this ex post form of the CAPM which, with the addition of a 
dividend yield term, is to be used for the study using cross sectional 
regression techniques which is documented in Chapter Six. 
The empirical market line has certain inherent features which suit it for 
use in empirical studies. Among these are that unlike the ex ante form 
of the CAPM it does not require that the term Yot approximates the risk 
free interest rate or that any of the parameter estimates remain constant 
over time. 
2.6 A CRITICISM OF THE APPROACH 
Roll has presented cogent criticism concerning the use of the empirical 
market line in tests of the appliGa~ility of the CAPM (9). 
His first criticism implies that the matching of data to the empirical 
- -
market line in an effort to derive the estimates Y0 t and Y1t in equation 
2.1 constitutes an incomplete test of the CAPM. Roll asserts that any 
test of the CAPM must simultaneously test the efficiency of the market 
portfolio as these are joint hypotheses. Mayers and Rice in offering a 
defence of this approach acknowledge that a definitive test of the CAPM 
would require this simultaneous test (10). They, however, point out that 
the determination and measurement of returns realized on the true market 
portfolio is not possible because it would include assets other than 
listed securities. Mayers and Rice therefore propose the use of an 
untested market index for tests of the CAPM. The basis for their 
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recommendation is that in the absence of a quantifiable return on a 
tested efficient market portfolio the alternative of an ordinary market 
index would still provide useful test results. This is supported by the 
argument that in the absence of significant market imperfections, 
rational return maximizing risk averse investors would construct 
efficient portfolios for themselves. As the market portfolio is simply 
the sum of all individual portfolios, it is not unlikely that the market 
portfolio would be approximately efficient. 
The remainder of Roll's criticism relates to the ex post assessment of 
security performance. Roll argues that should the index used to generate 
returns be ex ante efficient, then assuming the applicability of the 
CAPM, on average zero or statistically insignificant residuals would be 
noted. Roll further argues the converse that should the CAPM apply any 
statistically significant residuals from the empirical market line, over 
a large number of observations, imply ex ante inefficiency of the market 
index used. The association between this criticism and the study in 
Chapter Six arises because in terms of Roll' s criticism an inefficient 
index distorts the allocation of the return on a security between the 
terms Y1 tPi and Eit in equation 2 .1. This being so, as well as the 
regression ·Coefficients of the beta term being distorted, we may expect 
that bias in the residual term may affect the regression coefficients of 
the dividend yield term. 
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Mayers and Rice, however, defend the evaluation of security performance 
using the empirical market line ( 11). Where the return on an ex ante 
efficient market index is used in such a test, the implied correct 
assessment of the probability distribution of returns by investors would 
lead to almost perfect foresight which would result in insignificant 
residuals being noted. They therefore propose the usefulness of the 
above t;est in a market where diverse investor expectations produce a 
structure of security prices reflecting varying opinions. The 
probability distribution of returns assessed by this market may differ 
from that which ultimately occurs. This difference between expected and 
actual occurence would permit investors who correctly perceived the 
ultimate probability distribution of returns to plot above the empirical 
market line. Mayers and Rice acknowledge that this scenario would result 
in the market index being ex post inefficient which strictly would void 
the applicability of the CAPM. They, however, argue that this approach 
permits the use of the CAPM for the analysis of security performance. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
This Chapter has introduced the CAPM both in its ex ante form and in its 
ex post form, the empirical market line, which is to serve as the basis 
for the test to be carried out in Chapter Six. It has also raised 
criticism by Roll concerning its use in such tests. Although these 
criticisms have been defended by Mayers and Rice they constitute a 
possible though unlikely source of material distortion of the test 
results. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to document and make comment on arguments 
presented by other researchers as to whether the dividend policy of a 
firm ought to affect its value. The discussion does not consider 
empirical studies but rather depends on normative, deductive reasoning. 
Tests to ascertain whether financial policy decisions affect the value of 
a firm usually require that a valuation model be developed in terms of 
which these decisions may be assessed. To remain comprehensible, such 
valuation models by necessity usually make considerable simplifying 
assumptions concerning growth patterns and financing of firms, investor 
behaviour and institutional factors in capital markets. Often the effect 
of making these assumptions is to severely curtail the realism of the 
model. Choice of the particular model, however, is not considered 
critical as Miller and Modigliani argue that, properly developed, these 
alternative approaches to valuation reconcile(l). In considering 
valuation models more general theories which as far as possible, abstract 
from such restrictive assumptions must therefore be seen as more 
powerful. 
It is not intended to review earlier basic texts which propose valuation 
models under very res tr ic ti ve conditions. This discussion will begin 
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with a review of an argument, proposed by Miller and Modigliani, to the 
effect that under conditions of uncertainty the dividend policy of a firm 
is not a determinant of its value(2). The argument does not make 
significant assumptions concerning the processes used by investors to 
value shares and is therefore general in nature. Miller and Modigliani 
state: 
"For even without . a full fledged theory of what does determine 
market value under uncertainty we can show that dividend policy at 
least is not one of the determinants". 
The assumptions on which their analysis is based include perfect capital 
markets. Although unrealistic this simplifies the initial analysis and 
provides a base from which to progress. Two further concepts, imputed 
rationality and symmetric market rationality are then introduced. The 
condition of imputed rationality requires from every trader the 
assumption of rational behaviour on the part of every other trader. The 
condition of symmetric market rationality involves rational behaviour on 
the part of each trader and the assumption by each trader of the 
rationality of the market. These assumptions limit investors behaviour 
to rational actions which, while a departure from actual conditions, is 
not considered to detract significantly from the value of the 
conclusion. It will also be shown that these assumptions may be 
partially relaxed without affecting the result. 
- 22 -
The analysis proceeds by assuming two identical firms similar in all 
respects other than the possible dividend during the current period. 
Thus: 
X1(t) = x2(t) t = 0 •••. 00 
I1(t) = I2(t) t = 0 Q) 
D1(t) = n2(t) t = 1 ... Q) 
Where: Xi(t) = The total net profit of firm i during period t, 
I1(t) = The change in holding of physical assets by firm i 
during period t, 
Di(t) = The total dividend paid by firm i during period t. 
Bars above variables indicate currently unknown values (viewed from the 
beginning of period 0) to be extracted from probability distributions. 
The return to shareholders in firm 1 during period 0, R1(0) may be 
written as: 
(3 .1) 
Where: Vi(l) = The value of firm i at the beginning of period 1, 
mi(t+l) = The number of shares in firm i, issued during period t 
at the ex dividend closing price for period t, Pi(t+l) •. 
Using the accounting identity: 
Di1<1) P-1<1) = 11(0) - cx1co) - n1co)) 
which is substituted into equation 3.1 we get: 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
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A similar formula may be developed for R2(0). In comparing R1(0) and 
R2 (O) we note that by assumption X l (O) = X2 (O) and I1 (O) = I2 (O). By 
invoking symmetric market rationality V1(l) = V2(l), because they depend 
only on occurences after the beginning of period l which by assumption 
are identical for the two firms. For the purpose of this analysis it has 
been assumed by Miller and Modigliani that the dividend and investment 
decisions of firms are independent and therefore that the difference in 
gross investment between the two firms, which had arisen out of the 
difference in payout in period O, had been neutralized by a share issue. 
Because the determinants of R1(0) and R2(0) are equal, they must be equal 
and consequently V1(0) = V2(0). Therefore the value of a firm at the 
start of any period is shown to be invariant with respect to dividends 
paid during that period. 
The analysis may then be extended to a situation where dividend payments 
are allowed to varying in period l as well as in period 0. The only 
avenue by which period l dividends may affect V1(0) is through V1(l). 
But as already shown the value of a firm as of the beginning of any 
period is unaffected by distributions made during that period. 
Consequently V1(l) is unaffected by period l distributions. Again V1(l) 
and V2(l) must be equal despite differences in payout in both periods 0 
and l. Therefore V1(0) and Vz(O) must be equal. By continuing this 
argument it may be shown that the value of a firm as at any point in time 
is unaffected by future dividend payments. 
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As discussed the strength of this analysis is its generality whereby it 
circumvents most limiting factors attaching to other analyses. Miller 
and Modigiiani point out that their analysis implicitly assumes that all 
external financing is provided by equity issues. Their analysis 
therefore requires an extention to ascertain whether the existence of 
debt financing would alter the conclusion. To do so requires that two 
further terms be added to the right hand side of equation 3.1. The first 
would reflect that part of the return received by way of interest while 
the second would reflect the reduction in the return to shareholders by 
the amount of debt issued. Similarly the amount of debt raised would be 
added to the left hand side of equation 3.2 while the variable reflecting 
interest payments would be deducted from the right hand side in the same 
\ 
manner as the dividend variable. On substituting equation 3.2 into 3.1 
these two variables would set off leaving equation 3.3 unchanged. The 
dividend invariance proposition is therefore upheld despite the 
possibility of debt financing. 
The assumption of symmetric market rationality, necessary for the above 
conclusion, may be seen as excessively restrictive as it precludes 
irrational behaviour undertaken to benefit from irrational behaviour on 
the part of other investors. Brennan has shown that substantially the 
same conclusion may be reached from a weaker set of assumptions which he 
terms the independence of irrelevant information(3). These assumptions 
(modified by the writer) are: 
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(i) Investors are rational in prefering more wealth to less and in being 
indifferent to the form in which increments are received, 
(ii) Shares are valued only on the basis of their future prospects, 
(iii) At least some investors with sufficient resources to influence 
market prices are aware of assumption (ii). 
Under these assumptions certain of the investors would perceive that the 
current value of the two firms in the Miller and Modigliani analysis 
should be the same. Consequently they would arbitrage away any 
difference in value. The Miller and Modigliani analysis has therefore 
become fairly robust and for dividend policy to affect the value of a 
firm under conditions of uncertainty and perfect capital markets one of 
the following conditions is implied: 
(i) Investors are not rational, or 
(ii) Stock prices depend at least partly on past events, or 
(iii) There are no investors with significant resources who understand the 
security valuation process(4). 
In conclusion it may be said that this analysis, under the stated 
assumption of perfect capital markets, is generally regarded as 
conclusive. 
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Another analysis as to whether payout policy affects the value of a firm 
has been conducted by Gordon (5). Gordon has argued, predominantly on an 
intuitive basis, that a corporation's cost of capital is an increasing 
function of the rate of growth in its dividend. Because this growth rate 
is partially dependent on the retention rate (dividend policy) an 
association between a firm's cost of capital and hence its value and its 
dividend policy is implied. 
Under the direct assumptions that investors value securities on the basis 
of anticipated dividend streams, the expectation of no new equity 
financing, a stable debt to equity ratio, the retention of a constant 
fraction of earnings, b, and that the company earns a fixed rate of 
return, r, on its investments, Gordon shows that the value of a firm may 
be.written as: 
Y0 (1-b) 
k - br 
(3.4) 
Where: Po = The price of a share at the end of period O, 
Y0 = The earnings of period 0 attributable to one share, 
k The rate at which the company's future dividends are 
discounted •. 
; 
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Under the stated assumptions the value of a share is therefore given by 
the current dividend divided by the difference between the discount rate 
and the growth rate of the divid·end. 
Because shares are valued on the basis of expectations, Gordon argues 
that it is not critical that his assumptions are realized but rather that 
investors expect them to be realized. While this does insulate his 
argument, investors' perceptions of the profitability of fi rtus do vary 
and this must represent a weakness .in his model. 
If we assume that k and r are independent of b, the effect on price .of 
varying the payout ratio may be displayed by differentiating P0 with 
respect to b. 
aP0 (r - k) Y0 
= (3.5) 
ab (k - rb)2 
It immediately becomes obvious that setting the rate of return on 
investment, r, equal to the discount rate, k, neutralizes the effect on 
the share price of a change in the retention ratio. By setting r above 
or below k the effect on share price of differing retentions is 
displayed. However, the response of the share price to a change in 
retention is not due to the change in payout itself but rather to the 
profitablity of the incremental investment. Stated differently, because 
the possibility of external financing has, by assumption, been excluded 
from this -analysis the investment and dividend decisions have become 
interrelated. · Recall the definition of dividend policy which is the 
decision to distribute a certain proportion of earnings such that the 
investment decisions are not influenced by the amount to be paid in 
dividends. 
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The analysis is continued by by restating equation 3.4 as follows: 
Y0 (1 - b) 
Po 
= k - br (3.6) 
The left hand side of this equation is the dividend yield. Gordon notes 
that an assumption of k being independent of b and r may not be realistic 
as very high profitability would imply a negative dividend yield. On 
intuitive grounds he advocates that the discount rate k may well be an 
increasing function of the growth rate. It is argued that as the growth 
rate rises investors would accept a lower yield, but the required yield 
would be expected to fall by less than the increase in growth thus 
implying a rising discount rate, k. 
In reality a negative value for (k - br) seems unlikely for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as Gordon notes firms with very high rates of 
profitability may be expected to use external financing thereby violating 
one of the original assumptions. Secondly where extraordinary 
profitability has prompted the use of external financing, this together 
with high earnings retention is likely to lead to a fall in r, the rate 
of profitability, thereby stabilising br. Thirdly by excluding the 
possibility of external financing the growth rate in the dividend is 
maintained at br. However, should the model be expanded to allow equity 
issues the growth in per share dividends would probably fall. 
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Therefore by relaxing the assumptions on which Gordon's analysis is based 
such that actual market conditions are allowed, the basis for his 
proposition that k should be an increasing function of hr, namely that hr 
might exceed k thus implying a negative dividend yield, appears to fall 
away. 
Gordon continues his analysis by offering reasons why one might expect 
the discount factor k to be an increasing function of the growth rate in 
dividends, hr, and hence the retention rate, b (6). Gordon considers a 
firm that is expected to earn a constant amount in perpetuity, Y0 , which 
will all be distributed. Furthermore the firm is expected to use no 
external financing. The firm's value, being the discounted future 
receipts, may then be given as: 
Yo 
Po= ---
(l+k) 
+ 
Yo 
(l+k)2 
+ 
Yo 
+ ..•• + -- + ........ (3.7) 
(l+k)t 
Should the firm then decide to retain its first period earnings under the 
expectation of earning a rate of return, k, its value may now be given 
as: 
0 
Po= ---
(l+k) 
(l+k)Y0 
+----
(l+k)2 
+ 
(l+k)Y0 
(l+k)3 
(l+k)Y0 
+ •••• + + ••.• (3.8) 
(l+k)t 
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By setting the rate of return on the incremental investment to k Gordon 
·has left the value of the firm unaffected by the retention. He notes 
that by setting the rate of return on the new investment to a rate 
different to k the firm's value is altered. The reason for the change 
is, however, the profitability of the investment and not the change in 
payout. 
two assumptions are then made to continue the argument. These are that 
investors are risk averse and secondly that prospective cash receipts 
become less certain as the expected date of receipt becomes more 
distant. On the basis of these assumptions Gordon argues that it is not 
unreasonable to expect investors to discount future dividend streams at 
increasing rates for progressively more distant expected dividends. 
Equation 3.7 is therefore stated as follows: 
Po = + 
Yo Yo 
--- + •... + ---
(l+k3)3 (l+kt)t 
+ •••.•. (3.9) 
The constant discount factor, k, in equation 3.7 is seen as an average of 
the discount rates k1, k2, k3 in equation 3.9 such that discounting the 
dividend stream using k or the series k1, k2, k3 would yield the same 
result for P0 • By replacing the constant discount factor in equation 3.8 
by the factors dependent on the time perio~ we get: 
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P'o = 
0 (l+k) Y0 
+---
(l+k1) (l+k2)2 
(l+k) Y0 (l+k)Y0 + + ••• + + ••• (3.10) 
(1 +k3)3 ' (1 +kt) t' 
Where P' 0 < P0 • 
Current dividends have been foregone in favour of larger subsequent 
payments which Gordon argues should be discounted at a higher rate to 
recognize their uncertainty. On this basis he argues that the dividend 
policy influences the value of the firm. 
It has been argued by Miller and Modigliani, in particular, that Gordon's 
analysis confuses the effects of dividend and investment policy (7). On 
an intuitive basis this may be demonstrated by considering a firm whose 
constitution allows it only to invest in bank deposits paying a fixed 
interest rate. This is assumed to be a risk free asset. If this firm's 
earnings are represented by equation 3 .10 there would seem to be no 
reason for proposing an increasing discount rate because distant receipts 
are as assured as current receipts. Stated differently, it is the 
writers opinion that the reason for Gordon proposing increasing discount 
rates is the uncertainty as to whether the investment will generate the 
expected cash flow rather than as to whether the cash will be distributed 
or retained. Furthermore, without the restrictive assumption of 
excluding new equity financing a financial manager would be in a position 
to alter the dividend receipts of shareholders between periods by the use 
of share issues. 
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In his analysis Gordon has relied on setting the rate of return on 
investment, r, equal to the discount factor, k, to prevent changes in the 
gross amount of investment, arising from changes in payout, from altering 
the value of the firm. In the context of Gordons argument Brennan(8) has 
shown that the change in the value of a firm implied by a change in 
retention is given by: 
.00 
E 
t=l 
1 (-1 + r E ) 
y=l (1 + kt+y)Y 
The only instance in which this expression will equal zero is when all 
the kt are· equal and where r is equal to k. Therefore time dependent 
discount rates imply a change in the gross amount of investment in the 
context of Gordon's argument, which is shown to attribute to dividend 
policy changes in the value of a firm arising from changes in investment. 
The discussion has considered two analyses, both abstracted from market 
imperfections. The Miller and Modigliani analysis is based . on 
assumptions concerning the rationality of investors behaviour and a 
traditional arbitrage argument. Gordon's argument is based on a model of 
the value of a firm and is considerably less general than that of Miller 
and Modigliani. The reason for this is that firstly it is restrictive in 
terms of the assumptions which it uses and secondly, as observed by 
Brennan, it specifically assumes that investors discount expected future 
dividends while Miller and Modigliani make no such assumption (9). 
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To summarize the discussion so far it may be said that under conditions 
of uncertainty, rational investor behaviour and no market imperfections 
dividend policy is unlikely to affect the value of a firm. 
It is generally accepted that the existence of capital market 
imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs may create a legitimate 
preference for certain payout ratios by various classes of shareholders. 
Because of the multitude of imperfections and the sometimes conflicting 
biases they may imply there exists no consensus as to the aggregate 
effect on share prices of these factors. There is, however, general 
agreement that the difference in taxation rates applicable to dividend 
income and capital gains is potentially the strongest biasing factor. 
Brennan was the first researcher to incorporate this difference into a 
pricing theory which was accomplished by amending the CAPM such that the 
before tax return on a share was partly dependent on its dividend 
yield( 10). This model was developed under the assumptions of 
proportional rather than progressive taxation, certain dividends and 
unlimited borrowing at a riskless rate of interest. Brennan's analysis 
represents a new approach to the examination of the effects of different 
shareholder tax structures on the value of a firm. While Brennan has 
developed a market valuation principle, previous work in this area has 
been directed toward manipulating a firm's financial policies to optimize 
the net return to a given set of shareholders with diverse tax 
positions. It has been argued that the emphasis of this earlier work has 
been misplaced because it does not recognise the opportunity for 
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investors to trade securities and thereby influence price~ ac~otding to 
aggregate market expectations rather than· by the preferences of a fixed 
set of investors(ll). 
This modified before tax CAPM may be stated in the ex ante form as 
follows: 
Where: E(Ri) = The expected return on security i, 
Rf = The risk free rate of return, 
- -H '= [E(Rm) - Rf] - T [E( om) - Rf], 
E(Rm) = The expected return on the market portfolio, 
T = The effective excess market wide marginal rate of tax 
on dividends over that levied on capital gains, being 
(Td - Tg)/(l - Tg),. 
= Respectively the weighted averages of investors' 
marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, 
where the weights depend on investors' marginal rates 
of substitution between expected return and varianc7 
of return, 
= Respectively the expected dividend yields on security 
i and on the market portfolio. 
If as is likely to occur, it is assumed that the term T is gre~ter than 
zero, then this equation implies that dividends are undesirable and that 
the securities of dividend paying firms must offer a premium of 
-T(E( oi)-Rf) to compensate for the taxation disadvantage. 
I, 
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INVESTOR TAX 
STATUS FORM OF RECEIPT 
DIVIDEND REALIZED CAPITAL GAIN 
Close Corporation Taxable at a rate of 50% Not taxable. Subsequent (Not a sharedealer) after deduction of an distributions to members 
allowance of 33 1/3%. are tax free. 
Subsequent distributions 
to members are tax free 
Close Corporation The position is the same Fully taxable at a rate 
(Sharedealer) as where the close corpo- of 50%. Subsequent dis-
ration is not classified tributions to members are 
as a sharedealer for tax- tax free. 
ation purposes 
Long term insurance* 40% of both dividends and capital gains are deemed 
(company/mutual) to be taxable income. This is then taxed at a rate 
of approximately 69% of deemed taxable income. 
* - The redistribution by these bodies of dividends and realized capital 
gains received may be taxable in the hands of the recipients depending 
o~ their tax status and the form of the redistribution. 
It should be noted that the effective rate of taxation on capital gains 
is considerably less than that depicted in the table as shareholders are 
in a position to defer the tax through realising the investment only a 
considerable time after the gain has occurred. 
On examining the table it is evident that individual investors will have 
distinct payout preferences, which are dependent on their tax status. It 
is also evident that the current taxation structure is unlikely to cause 
a market wide preference for particular payout ratios. 
Miller and Modigliani point out that the existence of these payout pref-
erences is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for shares of any 
particular payout group to realize consistently superior returns(l3). 
The reasoning leading to their proposed clientele effect is as follows: 
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"If for example, the frequency distribution of corporate payout 
ratios happened to correspond exactly with the distribution of 
investor preferences for payout ratios, then the existence of 
these preferences would clearly lead ultimately to a situation 
whose implications were different in no fundamental respect from 
the perfect market case. Each corporation would tend to attract 
to itself a "clientele" consisting of those prefering its 
particular payout ratio, but one clientele would be entirely as 
good as another in terms of the valuation it would imply for the 
firm." 
The implication of a perfectly operating clientele effect for a firm 
selecting its dividend policy is that in a state of market equilibrium 
one dividend policy is as good as another. The reason for this is that 
any firm that could have increased it's value by meeting the unsatisfied 
needs of any clientele group would already have done so. Accordingly any 
new firm will be faced with investors who already have the choice of all 
possible payout policies and who thus are unlikely to pay a premium for 
the dividend stream of the new firm. 
Miller and Modigliani further note that the demand for and supply of 
shares in a particular payout range need not coincide (14). The reason 
for this is that, in the absence of a universally desired payout ratio at 
either end of the dividend spectrum, investors are able to construct 
portfolios with required payout ratios using appropriate combinations of 
individual securities. 
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The .implication of a clientele effect is therefore that investors bias 
their investment decisions so as to minimize the costs arising from 
market imperfections. Whether or not they are willing or able to act in 
this manner is dependent on a variety of factors and the identification 
of any aggregate market wide effect becomes an empirical issue. Such a 
test in regard to the difference in effective tax rates applicable to 
di, vidend income and capital gains was conducted by Litzenberger and 
Rawaswamy and is reported in Chapter Four (15). 
While the approaches to valuation which have been discussed have 
generally been couched in terms of valuation models, existing patterns of 
dividend payout may be explained by relatively recently developed agency 
theory, rather than by capital market imperfections. Rozeff has argued 
that with the seperation of management and ownership in inost large 
corporations, managements are in a position to advance their own 
interests over those of the shareholders(l6). Consequently it would be 
logical for shareholders not involved in the management of firms to take 
action which would result in managements' actions being monitored. Such 
action might include encouraging higher dividend payments which would 
require firms to resort to new equity financing more often than would 
otherwise be the case. Frequent share issues would result in close 
scrutiny of firms by new suppliers of capital which would encourage 
better management performance. The use of new equity £ inancing is, 
however; relatively more expensive than the retention of earnings since 
transaction cos ts are incurred. Consequently an optimal payout ratio 
might be suggested whereby transaction costs on new equity issues are 
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-( 
,.r 
minimized for an appropriate level of market scrutiny of management. 
While an extremely elegant theory, which appears to coincide with current 
dividend practice, the writer doubts that absentee shareholders make 
conscious decisions in favour of generous dividend policies with the 
express purpose of precipitating closer observation of managements by 
market agents. 
This chapter has provided an overview of various arguments as to whether 
the dividend policy of a firm ought to affect its value. While it is 
generally accepted. that under conditions of perfect capital markets 
dividend policy is unlikely to affect the value of a firm, we are unsure 
as to the influence of market imperfections on security returns. Miller 
and Modigliani. have provided a cogent argument as to why security returns 
should be independent of all but the most powerful of imperfections. The 
difference in rates of taxation applicable to dividend income and capital 
gains is probably of sufficient strength to introduce such a bias. In 
view of the current diverse taxation structure the resolution of this 
issue is an empirical question. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The objective of this chapter is to present a summary and discussion of 
previous research undertaken by other writers. The sequence in which.the 
research is reported will highlight the evolution of the empirical 
procedures employed. However, the review will cover only certain central 
studies and is not exhaustive. 
Unfortunately the survey is generally confined to tests conducted on 
American equity markets as the volume of published works documenting 
local tests is limited. 
Prior to discussing the valuation aspects of dividend policy a brief 
outline of the dividend setting process would be appropriate. These 
comments constitute the main conclusions of a paper by John Lintner 
documenting a series of interviews on dividend policy with senior 
financial officers of large American companies (1). The companies 
selected for analysis were well established companies listed on a stock 
exchange and may be broadly classified as industrial as opposed to 
financial or mining companies. The 28 companies selected were chosen for 
the wide range of characteristics which are known to or may be expected 
to exert significant influence on the dividend decision. 
Throughout Lintner's analysis it is apparent that the dominant concern of 
those setting the dividend is the expectations of shareholders. The 
managements felt that shareholders valued a consistent and increasing 
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dividend and that erratic policies were less favoured. It is also 
apparent that managements regard the constancy and trend in dividend 
payments as being critical to shareholders in their assessment of the 
performance and prospects of the firm. Managements further perceive a 
communication problem with shareholders in respect of unusual or 
unexpected dividend changes. 
dividend decision. 
These beliefs manifest themselves in the 
Lintner reported that the first consideration in the dividend setting 
process was whether a change in the existing rate was justified. Once a 
change had been decided on it was considered as a percentage of the 
existing dividend rather than deciding on an appropriate distribution 
level based on current earnings. Managements felt obliged to distribute 
to shareholders a portion of any permanent increase in earnings. The 
reason for this is that considering the high level of publicity accorded 
earnings figures managements feared a negative shareholder reaction 
should part of these not be distributed. It was this obligation coupled 
with managements reluctance to cut dividends in poor years that has led 
to the pattern of dividends adjusting to an increased level of earnings 
over a number of years rather than immediately. It was further observed 
that should allowance be made for the gradual adjustment of dividends to 
earnings the majority of companies exhibited a relatively constant payout 
ratio. Accordingly the change in the dividend in any particular period 
may be stated as follows: 
~Dit = Ai + Ci (Eitri - Di(t-1)) + Uit 
Where: ~Dit The change in the dividend on share i paid in period t 
relative to the previous period, 
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= The dividend paid on share i during period t-1, 
= The speed of adjustment and target payout ratios 
respectively for share i. These factors are relatively 
constant over time, 
= The per share earnings of share i during period t, 
= A firm specific constant, either zero or positive, 
reflecting managements' reluctance to cut dividends in 
poor years, 
= A term reflecting the difference between the actual and 
expected dividend change. 
As implied by the above equation a firm already distributing its targeted 
proportion of profits and experiencing static earnings will have zero or 
a very low change in payout. This in fact seemed to be the case even 
where some other factor suggested the desirability of a change. Thus it 
was observed that earnings most of all provided the stimulus for a change 
in the dividend. 
Related to t~e above is the possible conflict between viable investment 
projects and the maintenance of the trend in dividends. Lintner notes 
that the established target payout and speed of adjustment ratios 
normally result from formalizing previous ad hoc decisions into a set 
policy. These decisions were usually reached taking into consideration 
the company's expected investment, working capital and funds flow 
requirements. Accordingly standard investment requirements could be met 
as well as satisfying the current dividend expectations of shareholders. 
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However, where companies were presented with many profitable investment 
projects these would be financed as far as possible with internal 
resources, with managements preferring to strain liquidity rather than 
alter the dividend. Where potential investments exceeded the internal 
financing capacity, the interviews revealed that projects were 
re-evaluated with a view to utilizing external financing. Where merited 
the external financing was arranged and the project undertaken. If 
company policy disallowed the use of external financing the projects were 
abandoned or rescheduled. Thus it may be said that managements generally 
attach sufficient importance to established dividend policies to prefer 
rescheduling or abandoning investment projects to disappointing the 
dividend expectations of shareholders. 
A similar, though more limited, survey has been performed on South 
African firms by Seneque and Gourley (2). Their findings are 
substantially in accordance with the results of Lintner's analysis. 
'To conclude this section on the dividend setting process the main points 
may be summarized as follows: 
(i) The primary consideration in setting the dividend is whether or 
not the existing rate should be changed, 
(ii) The stimulus for a -change in the dividend is generally provided 
by changes in earnings, 
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{iii) The majority of companies exhibit a relatively constant target 
payout ratio and speed of adjustment ratio, 
{iv) The maintenance of an established dividend policy generally takes 
precedence over liquidity and investment considerations. 
To serve as an introduction to the review of the various empirical 
procedures it would be useful to consider an intuitively appealing test 
where price earnings ratios are regressed against dividend payout ratios, 
defined as the sum of the latest final and interim dividends divided by 
the per share earnings. 
graphically in Figure 4.1. 
A typical result of such a study is shown 
' 
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FIGURE 4.1 
GRAPH OF PRICE EARNINGS RATIO VS PAYOUT RATIO 
Price Earnings 
Ratio 
PEz 
DE1 DE2 Payout Ratio 
A strong positive association between payout and price ea,rnings ratio is 
normally observed. In some cases this has led earlier researchers to 
assert that an increase in payout from DE1 to DE2 would result in the 
capitalization rate for the firm's earnings increasing from PE1 1to PE2. 
Unfortunately this argument is open to a number of criticisms. Firstly 
the earnings per share is represented in both terms in this study. 
Consequently the regression is equivalent to a regression of share price 
on dividend per share. As shares on which large absolute dividends are 
paid are likely to have correspondingly high earnings, it may be argued 
that these high per share prices reflect the high earnings rather than 
the dividend. It is the writer's opinion that this is a major factor 
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influencing the strong correlation coefficient. The point is that 
caution must ·be exercized where share prices are used in these tests. 
The studies undertaken by the writer have used returns on shares rather 
than share prices. 
Secondly one may argue that the risk attaching to an investment in a 
share may induce an association between payout and price earnings ratios 
(3). Risky firms, through uncertainty regarding their future cash flow, 
are likely to distribute a lower proportion of their earnings than less 
risky firms. The earnings of risky firms are also likely to be 
capitalized at a higher rate than less risky firms. Consequently risky 
firms will probably be characterized by both low payout and low price 
earnings ratios. In view of this it is necessary to control for the risk 
associated with an investment when performing· such tests. The cross 
' 
sectional regression study reported in Chapter Six uses an amended 
empirical market line to identify any impact of dividend policy on the 
value of a firm. The inclusion of a beta factor in the equation will 
prevent any distortion of the test results through a risk induced 
association between the dependent and independent regression variables. 
A third factor which may induce a co-movement between payout and price 
earnings ratios where no true correlation exists is temporary 
fluctuations in earnings (4). Consider a firm experiencing temporarily 
depressed earnings. Because .management anticipate a return to a higher 
level of profitability neither the dividend nor the share price fall in 
proportion to the earnings. Consequently a high payout ratio and a high 
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price earnings ratio result. The opposite situation would be expected 
where a firm experienced temporarily inflated earnings. This problem 
arises from poor research design in that the earnings per share figure 
has been included in both variables. The approach adopted in Chapter Six 
avoids this. 
In view of these criticisms little confidence may be attached to the 
research results obtained and a more sophisticated approach to the 
problem is obviously required. Nevertheless the above discussion has 
served to introduce empirical procedures and has highlighted certain 
basic difficulties. 
A significant contributing factor to the widespread belief that a 
generous dividend payout positively influences the value of a firm are 
the results of numerous cross sectional regression studies using an 
equation similar to the following (5): 
Pit = a + b Dit + c Rit + Eit (4.1) 
Where: Pit = The price of a share in company i at the end of period t, 
Dit = The dividend paid on a share in company i during period 
t, 
Rit = The undistributed portion of period t earnings on a share 
in company i, 
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a,b,c = Coefficients arising from the regression, 
Eit = An error term. 
Significantly larger values for the coefficient b than for have 
traditionally been observed. The resultant conclusion of a dividend 
effect has, however, been criticised with the view proposed that the 
construction of the regression equation creates a spurious association 
between share price and dividend payout. These comments constitute the 
main points of a criticism by Friend and Puckett of standard cross 
sectional regression investigations of the kind under discussion (6). 
As with the previous form of test undertaken, inadequate provision for 
controlling risk has been made in equation 4.1. An upward bias of the 
dividend coefficient reflecting the risk induced co-movement between 
payout and price may therefore be expected. 
Further the regression equation requires the addition of a variable to 
reflect each firm's growth pattern. Firms with strong growth patterns 
would be characterized by relatively higher per share prices and the 
larger retentions necessary to finance the growth. Should the growth be 
financed from external sources rather than retentions the relationship 
between retentions and the growth rate, and consequently the share price 
would be affected. The estimate c would accordingly be artificially 
low. In other circumstances it is possible that the omission of an 
-external financing variable may inflate the estimate c. The point is 
that regression equations require adequate variables to prevent the 
distortion of regression results from the correlation of actual and 
omitted variables. 
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Two further related problems may also be responsible for a suppressed 
regression coefficient of the retained earnings variable. The first 
point relates to short run variations in income which, because of their 
temporary nature, are not fully reflected in dividend payments and the 
share price. As these variations are reflected in the retained earnings 
variable its associated regression coefficient is likely to be biased 
downward. This point is essentially the same as that discussed in 
relation to the first investigation. 
The second earnings related problem is that of income measurement. As 
dividends can be accurately measured, while earnings by their nature are 
estimates, the cross sectional regression coefficients for earnings will 
be artificially reduced as the estimates of its associated variable are 
subject to error. No simple solution to this problem is apparent as 
differing revenue recognition principles are applicable to various 
industries. In addition the effects of different judgements inside a 
uniform set of accounting policies would largely frustrate efforts to 
standardize earnings. Due to these problems the test documented in 
Chapter Six has avoided the use of earnings data. 
The way in which cross sectional regression studies are set up define 
which variables are independent and which is dependent. The results of 
these studies, however, in no way demonstrate causality. Friend and 
Puckett point out·that high price earnings ratios may induce managements 
, 
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to rely more heavily on share issues. With capital requirements 
satisfied from external sources a higher payout ratio results. Thus high 
price earnings ratios may be seen as a cause rather than the result of a 
liberal distribution policy. Regression equation 4.1 does not recognize 
this reciprocal effect and consequently dividend regression coefficients 
may be biased upward. 
This concludes Friend and Puckett's criticism of previous work 
undertaken. The following section documents a series of cross sectional 
regressions undertaken by them using various techniques intended to avoid 
the problems already discussed. The tests are based on a constant data 
set which permits a comparison of the results achieved using the various 
equations. The information set consists of 10 samples each with data 
from 20 companies. The ten samples represent five industry groups each 
over the years 1956 and 1958. These years were chosen because the former 
was a boom year with share prices levelling off after strong growth while 
the latter was a year of economic depression but with relatively strong 
share prices. 
The results of the first cross sectional regression carried out using 
regression equation 4 .1 are reported in table 4 .1. It's purpose is to 
serve as a basis for comparison with the results of subsequent more 
complex regressions. 
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TABLE 4.1 
CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
EQUATION Pt = a + hDt + Cat 
AVERAGE REGRESSION COEFFICIENT 
INDUSTRY YEAR 
- b -a c 
Chemicals 1956 -,86 29.94 2.91 
1958 -5,29 27.72 13.15 
Electronics 1956 7.32 7.27 17.87 
1958 8.53 13.56 26.85 
Electric 1956 ,85 13.86 14.91 
Utilities 1958 l. ll 14.29 18.54 
Foods 1956 ,78 15.56 5.23 
1958 1,50 17.73 4.35 ~ 
Steel 1956 -2.28 17.60 2.45 
1958 8.55 15.23 5.98 
Qther than for chemicals, which was considered a growth industry during 
the time the test was carried out, the results indicate a dividend 
preference in the case of stable industries and a preference for retained 
earnings in growth industries. Roughly equivalent importance is, 
however, attached to dividends and retained earnings in the case of 
electric utilities. It is the writer's opinion that the noted 
preferences at least partly represent the differences between the 
profitability of firms' investments and the rates of return available to 
investors. 
The following test carried out by Friend and Puckett used the same 
equation as in the previous test with a further term added, i.e. the 
earnings to price ratio lagged by one period. This term is added because 
it is assumed that the aggregate effect of all firm specific factors, 
such as risk and growth patterns, are reflected in the firm's 
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capitalisation rate. The use of market estimates of the value of these 
firm specific factors is extremely useful as it circumvents measurement 
problems which would be encountered if other methods were to be employed 
(7). The writer does not favour this approach to neutralizing firm 
specific effects for two reasons. Firstly, the measurement of earnings 
and their short term fluctuations may distort the earnings to price 
ratio, thus influencing the regression results (8). Secondly, Friend and 
Puckett introduce the use of this variable on the assumption that payout 
levels do not influence the capitalization rate. Should the amount of 
the dividend influence the capitalization rate, one independent 
regression variable influences another. This co-movement would reduce 
the regression coefficient of the dividend yield term. The results of 
this study have not been separately reported here as they differ little 
from those arising from the previous test. 
Friend and Puckett then repeat the previous test after having allowed for 
any effect of share price on dividend payout. Little change in the 
regression results was noted and it was concluded that the effect of 
share price on dividend payout was probably not a serious biasing factor 
in the original tests. 
J 
Friend and Puckett subsequently carried out various other cross sectional 
regression studies. All except one included either the share price 
lagged one period or the earnings to price ratio as an independent 
variable. For reasons already stated use of these variables may distort 
the regression coefficients of the dividend term and consequently these 
studies are not reported or discussed here. 
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The problem of short run earnings fluctuations may be successfully 
approached by replacing the retained earnings variable in equation 4.1 by 
a normalized value. Instead of using averaging techniques Friend and 
Puckett favoured the use of market generated information. The 
assumptions made in using this approach are, firstly, that short run 
earnings movements do not distort the dividend price ratio. Secondly, 
such earnings fluctuations are assumed to sum to zero over the full 
sample in any period. Price earnings ratios of individual firms are, 
however, altered by the earnings changes. With the subscripts i, k and t 
denoting the i th firm, the k th sample and time period t, it was 
postulated that fluctuations in the time series trend (E/P)ftf(E/P)kt 
were caused solely by short run earnings disturbances as (E/P)kt is by 
definition free of such effects. The following linear modeling of the 
trend was undertaken: 
(E/P)ftf(E/P)kt 
Normalised retained earnings were then calculated as follows, with the 
superscript n denoting a normalized value: 
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 4.2. 
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TABLE 4.2 
CROSS SECTIOHAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
EQUATION Pt = ; + b Dt + ~nt 
AVERAGE REGRESSION COEFFICIENT 
INDUSTRY YEAR 
-a b c 
Chemicals 1956 -6.37 27.84 10.96 
1958 -5.87 25.78 18.82 
Foods 1956 3.00 15.11 3.83 
1958 2.20 15.96 4.91 
Steels 1956 o.34 15.36 4.85 
1958 6.11 14.37 8.24 
The results of this regression study reveal a less marked preference of 
dividends although they still dominate. Friend and Puckett therefore 
conclude that in general it seems that dividends may well be more highly 
valued in stable industries while the retention of earnings appears to 
dominate in the noted case of a growth industry. However, they have not 
demonstrated that the general conclusion reached by prior researchers, 
namely that the value of a firm is influenced by the level of dividend 
distribution, is incorrect. 
The study by Friend and Puckett was an early attempt to determine the 
effect of dividend policy on the value of a firm. It is the writer's 
opinion that no suitable means was found to control for firm specific 
factors such as growth patterns and risk. Consequently the continued 
dominance of dividends over retained earnings in certain industry 
categories is not assured until this problem is resolved. 
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Black and Scholes in a later study using the subsequently developed CAPM 
reinvestigated this issue (9). Their test is markedly more sophisticated 
because the study is performed within the context of a valuation model 
whereas the Friend and Puckett study tested the direct association 
between two variables. Use of this model is, however, subject to Roll's 
critique and it further assumes that the CAPM is the model used to price 
assets on Stock exchanges (10). Roll's critique is discussed in Chapter 
Two. Fama and MacBeth have provided evidence of the applicability of the 
CAPM to the New York Stock Exchange on data from which the Black and 
Scholes study was performed (11). 
The Black and Scholes study involved the use of procedures equivalent to 
cross sectional regression techniques using data over the period 1936 to 
1966 which had been grouped into portfolios. The form of the regression 
equation was: 
Where: Rj = The return on the j th porfolio, 
Y0 = Coefficient arising from the regression which 
should equal the risk free interest rate, 
= 
= 
The return on the market portfolio, 
The beta of the j th portfolio, 
Y1 A coefficient arising from the regression which 
demonstrates the effect of dividend yield on the 
before tax return on securities, 
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cSj ,om = Respectively the dividend yield on the j th 
portfolio and the market over the year prior to 
that in which the test was conducted, 
~j = An error term. 
The use of the ex post form of the CAPM in this study avoids the problems 
associated with income measurement and fluctuations in income which were 
discussed in the review of work by Friend and Puckett. Furthermore a 
beta term has been added to control for risk. The positive risk induced 
association between payout and share price arising in the Friend and 
Puckett study is further controlled for by Black and Scholes through the 
construction of the cross sectional regression equation (12). Low risk 
shares traditionally sell at relatively high prices thus offering low 
returns. Use of these security returns rather than security prices as 
the dependent variable in the cross sectional regression equation 
therefore avoids this coincidental co-movement between independent and 
dependent variables. 
The possibility of the test results being influenced by growth patterns 
does not arise as the specific relationship between the retention of 
earnings and share price is not addressed. 
The estimates for the term Y1, being the monthly excess return, for the 
full test per·iod and for a number of sub-periods are shown in Table 4.3. 
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TABLE 4.3 
ESTIMATES OF Y1 
REGRESSION EQUATION Rj = Y0 + [Rm. - Y0 JPj + Y1(oj 
-TEST Y1 
INTERVAL 
1936 - 66 0,0009 
1947 - 66 0,0009 
1936 - 46 0,0011 
1947 - 56 0,0002 
1957 - 66 0,0016 
1940 - 45 0,0018 
The results over the full test period show a value for Y1 of 
approximately 1% per year which is not statistically significant. None 
of the results for any of the sub-periods are significant on a 
statistical basis. Black and Scholes consequently concluded that 
dividend yield does not materially impact the before tax rate of return 
on a security. Because Y1 was insignificantly different from zero it was 
argued that its true value may be zero or even negative and consequently 
investors are unaware of the direction of any effect of dividend policy 
on before tax security returns. For this reason it was proposed that tax 
exempt investors may ignore the dividend policy of prospective investees 
when making investment decisions. The analysis was then extended to 
cover a situation where capital receipts are tax exempt and where 
dividend receipts are taxed at a rate of 50%. Black and Scholes then 
estimated the term Y1 on an after tax basis by deducting 50% of the 
average dividend yield of the full sample from the before tax average 
estimate of Y1· Because the resultant term was insignificantly different 
from zero they concluded that even investors experiencing a high marginal 
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tax rate may ignore dividend yield in maximizing their return on a 
portfolio. They then proposed that because it is not possible to 
identify any significant effect of dividend yield on security returns, 
investors are likely to ignore yield when constructing portfolios. 
Consequently, because we are unable to identify any dividend effect, 
dividend yield loses its ability to affect security returns even if it is 
an actual determinant of value. 
Two further arguments were presented for investors ignoring the dividend 
policy of prospective investees. Firstly biasing portfolios toward 
either high or low yield shares increases transaction costs as 
adjustments to portfolios are required as companies alter their dividend 
policies. Secondly Black and Scholes argue that the introduction of a 
dividend yield constraint on portfolio construction diverts effort from 
attaining adequate investment diversification. Thus it was finally 
concluded that investors in any tax bracket may ignore the dividend 
policy of firms in whom they are considering an investment. 
The implication of the test results for companies is that their dividend 
policy is unlikely to have an effect on the value of their shares. 
Consequently large capital requirements could be most economically met by 
reducing the payout. 
The writer disagrees with the interpretation of the Black and Scholes 
test results in the case of non tax exempt investors. It is submitted 
that if dividend yield is demonstrated to have no significant impact on 
the before tax return on a security then investors who are subject to 
heavier taxation on dividends (capital gains) than capital gains 
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(dividends) are able to maximize their individual return by holding 
shares offering a low (high) dividend yield. This biasing of individual 
portfolios does not imply a disequilibrium in the demand and supply of 
shares exhibiting particular yields because certain investors would 
prefer high yield shares and others low yield shares and the supply of 
shares at each payout level would be expected to adjust to the demand. 
Consequently while investors are able to adjust their after tax return by 
selecting investments suited to their tax profile, any firm contemplating 
a particular dividend policy would be faced by shareholders who already 
have a complete range of dividend alternatives. Therefore firms are 
unlikely to increase their value by manipulating their dividend policy. 
Finally, it is the writer's opinion that the Black and Scholes analysis 
implies that non tax exempt investors stand to gain by altering their 
portfolios to accommodate their tax status. It is, however, acknowledged 
that in favouring certain yields further effort is required to maintain 
an optimally diversified portfolio. 
In this regard it has been argued by Long that at any given level of 
expected portfolio return investors are unable to alter the form of their 
return between dividends and capital gains 
efficiency of the portfolio diversification (13). 
without reducing the 
By allowing the risk 
and expected return to vary efficient portfolios may, however, be 
constructed at varying dividend yields. Furthermore, adjusting the 
dividend yields of portfolios may still be beneficial in view of the 
sometimes substantial difference in effective taxation rates on dividend 
income and capital gains. By using fairly sophisticated selection 
techniques it is also possible to significantly change a portfolio's 
dividend yield without inducing too large a change in its risk level. 
- 61 -
The Black and Scholes study has been criticised as to the efficiency of 
the statistical procedures employed (14). The most significant of these 
criticisms is that a loss of precision resulted from grouping stocks into 
portfolios and that data for individual securities would have yielded 
superior results. The tests are usually conducted on shares in 
portfolios rather than on individual shares so that errors arising in the 
estimation of betas may be offset, resulting in accurate estimates for 
port folios. The statistical procedures necessary to achieve accurate 
estimates of beta for individual shares are, however, fairly complex. 
In their study Black and Scholes used the ex post version of the CAPM 
with a further dividend yield term added. The CAPM was, however, 
developed under the assumption of zero market imperfections such as 
personal or corporate taxes, a condition which is obviously not 
realized. Accordingly an extension of the existing pricing theory is 
required to accommodate these factors. Brennan was the first researcher 
to develop an amended form of the CAPM which offers a before tax return 
commensurate both with a security's systematic risk and its dividend 
yield (15). Brennan argues that the before tax return on a share is 
proportional with both its systematic risk and the effective excess 
market wide marginal rate of tax on dividends over that levied on capital 
gains. His work in this area has been discussed in the previous chapter. 
Investors may be in a position to remove or substantially reduce the 
effect of taxation on dividends by selecting shares and a level of 
gearing appropriate to their tax profile. Should investors be successful 
in this regard then the term in the Brennan analysis giving the effective 
excess taxation on dividends would approximate zero. Institutional 
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factors may, however, affect the ability of investors to act in this 
manner and whether or not they are successful is an empirical issue. 
This question has been investigated by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (16) 
who test the following amended form of the CAPM which is similar to that 
proposed by Brennan: 
Where: a,b,c = 
= 
Coefficients arising from the test, 
An error term. 
Other terms as used above. 
The study was carried out on data covering the period 1963 to 1977. 
There are certain features of the methodology which are unique to this 
test. Firstly monthly individual security data rather than data relating 
to shares in portfolios was used. The required accuracy of beta 
estimates for individual shares is attained by adjusting each estimate by 
a factor proportional to the standard deviation of the residual arising 
from the regression of the security return on the market index whereby 
the beta estimate was obtained. 
Previous studies have generally used a dividend yield estimate calculated 
by dividing the sum of all dividends paid on a share over any particular 
year by the price at the year end. These estimates are normally 
recalculated annually. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy argue that such 
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dividend yield estimates are inaccurate because, · inter alia, they 
overstate the true yield during months when a share does not go 
ex-dividend (17). 
To provi~e more meaningful dividend yield estimates a different procedure 
was adopted. Where a share did. not go ex-dividend during a particular 
month or where it went ex-dividend in relation to a non recurring payout 
announced during that month the dividend yi.e.ld was set to 'zero. Where a 
share went ex dividend in relation to a dividend announced in a prior 
month the yield for the current month was set using the dividend declared 
and the share price at the en.d of the preceding month. Finally, where a 
share went ex dividend in relation to a recurring dividend announced 
during the current month the yield was calculated using the price at the 
end of the preceding month and the recurring dividend ·paid a year 
previously. 
The reason for this aspect of research design is firstly that it 
recognises actual changes in the dividend yield from month to month. A 
further advantage is that the dividend yield estimate only uses 
information that is available to investors as at the beginning of each 
test period. 
The average regression coefficients and t statistics derived from this 
study are reported in Table 4.4. 
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TABLE 4.4 
CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
- - -EQUATION Ri-Rf = a + bPi + c(oi - Rf) + Ei 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Statistic 
INDEPENDENT 
a 
,00616 
4' 37 
REGRESSION 
b 
,00268 
1,51 
VARIABLE 
-c 
- .. 
,227 
6,33 
On the basis of these results Litzenberger and Ramaswamy concluded that 
there is a strong positive association between before tax returns and 
estimates of systematic risk and dividend yield. The implication is that 
because of the relatively heavy taxation attracted by dividends, 
shareholders prefer to receive their return on investment by way of 
capital appreciation rather than dlvidend income. 
Miller and Scholes have subsequently criticised the procedure ,used in 
this s~udy to control for the information content of dividends(l8). As 
was evident from the review of Lintner' s work on the dividend setting 
process fi.nns follow a process of dividend stabilization with the payout 
increasing in response to higher earnings (19). Furthermore, because of 
managements extreme reluctance to reduce dividends, an increase in payout 
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is made only when it is considered sustainable. Because shareholders 
recognize this dividend setting procedure it is likely that they would 
interpret an increase in dividends as a management perception of 
permanently higher earnings. It may also be argued that as well as 
implying the permanency of current earnings increases higher dividends 
may reflect a management perception of future earnings increases. Many 
commentators have therefore observed that dividends have the potential to 
convey information concerning a firm's earnings and hence its value. 
This has been a frustrating factor in research because a positive 
association between dividend payout and the return realized on a security 
may be expected, not because the dividend influences value directly, but 
rather because it conveys information critical to the valuation process. 
Adequate research design requires that empirical procedures ensure the 
separation of the effects on value of dividend policy and the information 
content of dividends. It is with this aspect of the Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy research design that Miller and Scholes take issue. 
Using the same regression equation as Litzenberger and Ramaswamy and data 
over the period 1940 to 1978 Miller and Scholes performed a number of 
cross sectional regression studies using various methods to calculate 
dividend yields. These were first calculated as in the Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy study and secondly, amongst other methods used, all items in 
the first sample were excluded where a share went ex-dividend in the same 
month that the dividend was announced. The results of these tests are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.5 
CROSS SECI'IONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
REGRESSION EQUATION Rt - Rf • ; + bPi + c(oi - Rf) + £1 
!INDEPENDENT REGRESSION VARIABLE 
- - -a b c 
Dividend Yields Average Regression 
Calculated as .in Coeffi.cient ,0065 ,0022 ,1794 
L & R Study 
t Statistic 4.9 1.4 6.1 
Share excluded 
where announce- Average Regression 
ment and ex divi- Coefficient ,0043 ,0035 ,0135 
<lend date fall in 
same month t Statistic 2.5 2.2 0.1 
Because the average regression coefficient of the divid'end yield t.erm in 
the second equation is presumed to be free of the effects of price 
sensitive info·rmation contained in dividend announcements, it is 
considered a stronger result than the outcome of the first test. In view 
of the fall in the average regression coefficient of the dividend yield 
term on conducting the second form of the test is was concluded that, 
despite the existence of different rates of taxation on dividends and 
capital gains, the dividend yield of a security does not appear to 
significantly influence the return realized on a share. 
Although not central to the valuation controversy a brief record of 
previous research to identify any price sensitive information contained 
in dividend announcements would be informative. The best acknowledged 
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of these studies is by Watts (20) conducted on data covering a period 
1945 to 1968 held on tapes of the CRSP (21). 
The hypothesis tested is that the change in dividends carries information 
relavant to the pricing of shares that is not contained in earnings 
announcements. To allow testing one must split the change in current 
payout between, firstly that which would be expected given the change in 
current earnings and other known factors influencing value and secondly 
unexpected changes. It is these unexpected changes in payout which are 
tested to ascertain any correlation with future earnings changes. 
A difficulty with studies of this kind is that an observed relationship 
between current unexpected dividend changes and future earnings changes 
does not necessarily imply that the former precipitated the subsequent 
earnings change. The reason for this is that managements' perceptions of 
improved future earnings may be reflected elsewhere prior to or 
simultaneously with unexpected dividend changes. Furthermore it is 
possible that the reflection of managements' positive expectations in non 
dividend areas may allow better prediction of future earnings than is 
possible by using unexpected current dividend changes. Should this be 
the case an association may still be observed between current unexpected 
dividend changes and future earnings changes, but there is no causal 
relationship between the two. Consequently should an effect be noted the 
best conclusion permitted is that the behaviour of earnings and stock 
prices is consistent with there being information content in dividend 
announcements but this is not proved. Should no effect be observed a 
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conclusion as to there being no information content is, however, 
allowed. Even where no causality exists a positive association between 
current unexpected dividend changes and future earnings changes is i I 
sufficient to distort test results as in the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
study. 
The question of the information content of dividends only becomes of 
significance where it is demonstrated that it would allow someone in sole 
possession of that information to earn excess returns. Watts addresses 
this issue. 
The empirical approach makes use of the abnormal performance index (API) 
technique introduced in Chapter Five. The residuals, of the 310 firms in 
the sample, which were derived using the market model were allocated to 
two API groups on the basis of the sign of an empirically derived 
forecast error, Zit, which is the difference between the actual change in 
dividend and that predicted by a dividend model. The model is an 
adaption by Fama and Babiak (22) of that first proposed by Lintner (23) 
and is stated as follows: 
Where: Zit = The unexpected change relative to the previous 
period in dividend on share i in period t, 
Eit The earnings attributable to share i during period t, 
Weightings given to independent variables in 
modelling the change in dividend on share i. 
Other term as used above. 
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The API technique results are presented in Table 4.6. They are shown over 
an extended period of time and are disclosed relative to the final month 
of the financial year. The reason for this form of disclosure is that 
because the critical info.rmation may be available through sources other 
than dividend announcements we are unsure as to in which month it is 
impounded into security returns. 
Month Relative to 
Last Month of 
Financial Year 
-11 
-10 
- 9 
8 
- 7 
- 6 
- 5 
- 4 
- 3 
- 2 
- 1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
TABLE 4.6 
MONTHLY API STATISTICS 
Cumulative API Results 
Zit> 0 Zit< 0 
0.996 
0.998 
1.003 
1.002 
1.004 
1.004 
1.003 
1.001 
1.000 
1.003 
1.006 
1.009 
1.003 
1.005 
1.010 
1.011 
1.011 
1.012 
1.011 
1.010 
1.007 
1.011 
1.012 
1.014 
0.995 
0.997 
1.002 
1.002 
1.001 
0.999 
1.000 
0.999 
0.997 
1.001 
1.001 
1.002 
0.996 
0.999 
1.005 
1.004 
1.004 
1.003 
1.003 
1.001 
1.000 
1.002 
1.006 
1.006 
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Because the differences in the API scores indicate that transaction costs 
incurred in trading on this information would exceed the realized profit 
Watts concluded that the information was trivial. 
The explanation offerred for this was that current unexpected dividend 
changes reflecting future earnings estimates are diluted by a firm's 
speed of adjustment ratio and its payout ratio to the extent that it is 
" 
indistinguishable from the estimation error. 
A result similar to that of Watts was obtained by Knight and 
Affleck-Graves in a study performed on data from the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (24). 
This Chapter has reviewed central empirical studies concerning the impact 
of dividend policy on the value of a firm. The overall conclusion 
reached has been that despite the presence of market imperfections 
dividend yield appears to exert insignificant influence on the before tax 
return realized on a security. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter documents a preliminary investigation conducted by the 
writer into the effects of dividend policy on the value of a firm. It 
also serves to introduce and discuss empirical techniques appropriate to 
the kind of investigation under discussion. 
5.2 RATIONALE 
It would be of interest to investors to identify any systematic effect of 
firms' dividend policies on the returns realised on their securities. 
This study will therefore observe the returns on portfolios of shares 
compiled according to their payout policies. The portfolios are 
constructed as of the date of firms' final earnings and dividend 
announcements because it is at this time that their dividend 
characteristics are established. The post announcement returns are then 
observed to identify any influence of firms' dividend policies on the 
returns realised on their securities. 
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It is, however, possible that a firm's dividend policy is associated with 
other factors critical to its valuation, such as risk. To be able to 
attribute to dividend policy any noted superior performance of a dividend 
group, requires that the returns realised on a security be adjusted to 
recognise the risk associated with that investment. This is achieved 
through a technique which removes from returns that portion attributable 
to market influences, leaving risk adjusted returns to be used in the 
analysis. 
It is these post announcement, risk adjusted returns accumulated into 
portfolios on the basis of their dividend characteristics which would be 
observed by investors with a view to identifying an association between 
dividend policy and return. 
5.3 METHOD 
5.3.l The Market Model 
Changes in the return earned on a share result from changes in 
expectations concerning that share's future prospects. Changes in such 
expectations derive from the release of previously unknown price 
sensitive information which, emanating from a large number of sources, 
has varying impact ranging from that having an economy wide impact to 
that relating to specific firms. 
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The market model proposed by Markowitz allows the separation of. the 
return earned on a security into those returns resulting from market wide 
influences and those resulting from firm specific events (1). These two 
factors are termed systematic and unsystematic components respectively. 
The firm specific or unsystematic portion of the return on a security 
constitute the 'residuals' of the market model which is specified as 
follows: 
Where: Rit = The return on share i during period t, 
Rmt = The return on the market during period t, 
Eit = The unsystematic return on share i during period t, 
ai,f3i = The y axis intercept and the slope coefficient 
peculiar to share i. 
It is the behaviour of these residuals which is analysed to identify any 
effect that dividend policy of a firm may exert on its value. The 
approach taken is to estimate the described residuals directly by 
regressing the return earned on a specific share i during period t 
against the market index for the corresponding interval. The technique 
used is that of ordinary least squares regression with the equation 
specified as follows: 
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Where: a1,~i = The estimates of the y axis intercept and slope 
co-efficient resulting from the regression. These 
estimates are peculiar to share i, 
~it = An estimate of the unsystematic return on share i during 
period t, 
Rit = Loge ( Pit + Dit ) 
(Pft-1), 
Dit = The dividend paid on share i during period t, 
Pit = The price of share i at the end of period t, adjusted 
for share splits and capitalisation issues during that 
period, 
Pit-1 = The price of share i at the end of period t-1, adjusted 
as in Pit above, 
Rmt = The return on the market during period t. 
The ordinary least squares method requires that the following assumptions 
are met: 
(a) E CE it) = 0 for all t 
.... Eit I) (b) o (Eft; = 0 for all t.;t I 
(c) 0 2 c'Eit> = 02 i for all t 
...... (d) o (Rmd Eit) = 0 for all t. 
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The first condition requires the expected value of the residual to be 
zero in each period, whilst the second condition requires that there be 
no autocorrelation between the observed residuals. These conditions are 
likely to be met as empirical. tests undertaken both locally and on the 
New York Stock Exchange reveal adherence to these assumptions (2). Tests 
on the data used indicated no auto-correlation (3). These first two 
conditions concern matching the regression line to the data and do not 
take a position on market efficiency. 
The assumption of a constant variance contained· in the third condition 
may not be completely fulfilled as empirical work has indicated 
observable departure from this condition (4). 
considered a critical weakness. 
It is not, however, 
The requirement of the fourth condition that the return on the market and 
the unsystematic return on a particular share are independent during any 
period could be frustrated by the following : 
(i) The return on share i being included in the market index, or. 
(ii) Industry characteristics may induce an association between these two 
·terms (5). 
Both of these effects are unlikely as a particular share would account 
for only a small percentage of the return on the market index, if 
included at all. Further, empirical work carried out in a South African 
context indicates that industry effects have a negligible influence on 
the return realised on a share (6). 
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The ordinary least squares technique was used to compute weekly residuals 
for a number of shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
5.3.2 The Abnormal Performance Index Technique 
Having established the residuals to be used in the study, the method of 
their analysis should now be considered. The method used employs a 
technique known as the abnormal performance index (AP!). A point in the 
price history of the share, in this case the date of the final earnings 
and dividend announcement, is designated as period 0 and the sequences of 
residuals of different firms and those of the same firm over different 
time periods are aligned on this point• This technique yields a return, 
resulting from firm specific factors, on an equally weighted investment 
in each ·of the shares in the sample. The AP! technique allows the 
observation o.f the post announcement behaviour of the combined residuals 
of the firms sampled. The profits and losses represented by the 
residuals are regarded as abnormal since they represent an excess return 
or loss a£ter allowing for the risk associated with that investment. 
The abnormal performance index is calculated as follows 
Where: N 
APlw 
I w 
E 
N n=l k=o 
The number of simultaneous final earnings and 
dividend announcements selected, 
The residual of share i in week k subsequent to 
the n th announcement sampled. 
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The aligning of the sequences of residuals of different ti.me periods and 
• different fi.rms on the announcement date is a posi.ti.ve feature of the 
techni.que as i.t minimises the effect of firm and time period specifi.c 
abnormalities in the residuals. 
An examination of the behaviour of the residuals surrounding the 
announcement date revealed that they were strongly positive over the 
entire sample (7). Tei counter the effects of this the announcement date 
for the purposes of the test was advanced by two weeks. 
5.3.3 Dividend Groupings 
The abnormal performance measured by the index if aggregated over the 
entire market would sum to nil. It therefore becomes necessary to 
differentiate the sample into a number of groups based on some dividend 
criteria and to calculate the API in respect of each of the groups, thus 
displaying any superior returns attributable to a particular dividend 
characteristic. 
On this basis the post announcement residuals were classified into three 
groups based on the payout ratio publicised in the announcement. The 
payout ratio was calculated by dividing the sum of the latest interim and 
final dividends by the earnings per share. 
The cut off points between the groups were arbitrarily decided. Payout 
ratios equal to or below 40% were classified as low payout ratios and 
those equal to or greater than 60% being classified as high payout· 
ratios. Distributions of between 40% and 60% were allocated to the 
intermediate group. 
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Distortion of these results may be introduced by the diversity in the 
accounting treatments used to calculate the earnings per share figures. 
Should the varying accounting treatments used overstate some firms 'true' 
earnings while understating others, distortion would be introduced as the 
high and low payout shares would be distributed among the three groups. 
Alternatively should there be a consistent bias in earnings in both 
magnitude and direction no distortion would result. This seems 
improbable as even if there is a predominance of under or overstatement, 
the magnitude cannot be expected to be constant between firms. Thus some 
element of distortion is probable. For this reason the above AP! 
calculation was repeated with the allocation between groups decided on 
the basis of dividend yield. This yield was calculated by dividing the 
sum of the latest interim and final dividends by the share price at the 
end of the week during which the announcement was made. 
5.4 DATA 
The data for use in this study covers a period of 404 weeks 
(approximately eight years) beginning on 26 January 1973. 
index used was the Rand Daily Mail (RDM) Index. 
The market 
The sample used for analysis, where the allocation to dividend groups was 
based on payout, comprised 248 simultaneous final earnings and dividend 
announcements during the above period. The selection criteria resulted 
in the number of announcements allocated to the low, intermediate and 
high payout groups being 91, 124 and 33 respectively. The composition of 
these groups is shown in Appendix One. 
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For the second test 231 announcements were apportioned again into three 
groups to obtain, as far as possible, an equal number in each group. 
This resulted in groups of 77 (dividend yields equal to or below seven 
percent), 81 (dividend yields from seven and a half percent to nine and a 
half ·percent) and 73 (dividend yields equal to or greater than ten 
percent). For the purposes of the apportionment the dividend yields were 
rounded to the nearest one half percent. The allocation between the 
• 
dividend yield groups is shown in Appendix One. 
Information concerning the dates of the announcements was obtained by 
questionnaire from firms (8). 
5.5 HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis to be tested using the methodology outlined is: 
H APimt = APiht 
as against the alternative hypothesis: 
(Or that the API score for any one dividend group d.iffers from that of 
any other). 
The subscripts 1, m and h indicate low, medium and high dividend payout 
or dividend yield groups. The subscript t denotes time period t. 
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5.6 TEST RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
The results of the two abnormal performance index tests are presented 
both in tabular form and graphically as shown below. 
Allocation to API Results API Results 
Dividend Group Presented Presented 
based on : in Table : in Figure : 
Payout Ratio 5.1 5.1 
Dividend Yield 5.2 5.2 
When interpreting these results it should be remembered that the indices 
reported are calculated from the end of the week subsequent to that in 
which the final earnings and dividend announcement was made. As already 
discussed, this was done to minimise the distortion introduced by the 
strongly positive API results in the period immediately surrounding the 
-announcement date. The comparison of the performance achieved by each of 
the groups is not signifi~antly affected as the influence of the positive 
residuals is relatively uniform across the full sample. 
The results have been reported for a period of only 20 weeks as at this 
stage forthcoming interim dividends would alter the dividend 
characteristics of the groups. 
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TABLE 5.1 
ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE INDEX STATISTICS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT GROUPS 
RELATIVE TO DATE OF FINAL EARNINGS AND DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT 
Cumulative API Score 
Week 
RelatlVe to 
Week Announcement Total High Medium Low Nwnber Date Sample Payout Payout Payout 
1 +2 1,006 1,006 1,000 1,014 
2 +3 1,008 1,015 1,006 1,008 
3 +4 1,009 1,011 1,007 1,010 
4 +5 1,010 1,016 1,003 1,016 
5 +6 1,014 1,027 1,009 1,017 
6 +7 1,014 1,017 1,004 1,026 
7 +8 1,014 1,010 1,004 1,028 
8 +9 1,018 1,017 1,008 1,032 
9 +10 1,019 1,022 1,008 1,033 
10 +11 1, 016 1,009 1,006 1,032 
11 +12 1,016 1,011 1,002 1,033 
12 +13 1,015 1,020 1,000 1,035 
13 +14 1,017 1,028 ,996 1,042 
14 +15 1,012 1,020 '991 1,038 
15 +16 1,007 1,015 ,985 1,034 
16 +17 1,008 1,015 ,984 1,037 
17 +18 1,010 1,014 ,986 1,041 
18 +19 1,003 1,002 ,978 1,039 
19 +20 1,001 ,992 ,974 1,040 
20 +21 1,006 ,998 ,978 1,048 
A 
p 
I 
1 .05 
1 .04 
1.03 
1 .02 
'1 .01 
1 
o_gg 
O.QS. 
0.97 -
FIGURE 5. 1. 
APISCORES 
ALLOCATION TO DIVIDEND GROUPS 
BASED ON PAVOUT RP.TIO. 
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5.6.1 Dividend Groups Based on Payout Ratios 
Turni.ng to the analysis carried out based on the payout ratios, no clear 
pattern of returns based on payout emerges. An interesting feature is 
the increasing divergence of the abnormal returns attributable to the 
three payout groups. At week 20 the cumulative AP! of the low payout 
group exceeds that of the high payout group by 5, 0% (AP! 1,048 VS 
• 998). A difference of 5,0% is significantly in excess of the 
transaction costs incurred in acquiring and subsequently disposing of a 
shareholding. The impression of a dividend effect given by the 
divergence of the AP! scores does not appear warranted when one examines 
the ranking of the eventual results. Although the low payout group 
dominates the high payout group for the last 14 of the 20 weeks, the AP! 
scores of the high payout group exceed those of the intermediate group 
throughout the 20 week period. Thus the existence of a dividend effect 
appears doubtful. 
The test undertaken is a preliminary at tempt to identify chan~es in the 
returns earned on a share in the period subsequent to an earnings and 
dividend announcement, . where· the alteration in the returns earned is 
related to the firms payout ratio or dividend yield. As the AP! results 
are measured relative to a specific public announcement any dividend 
effect may be expected to manifest its elf shortly after the 
announcement. In interpreting the AP! scores more significance should 
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therefore be allocated to scores close to the announcement date and less 
weight given to more distant results. More distant API scores may be 
expected to be influenced by later information releases having a bearing 
on expected dividend levels. Accordingly, with the passing of time, the 
three groups become less representative of their original payout 
characteristics. On examining table 5.1 one can see that the high and 
low payout groups produce largely similar results for the first six 
weeks. Only .from week 6 does the low payout group achieve consistently 
higher cumulative API results. In view of this the existence of' a 
negative dividend preference seems uncertain. 
However, one should note that neither the high nor the intermediate 
payout group exhibit any clear direction during the first nine weeks 
while the low payout group, apart from a 0.6% reversal during week 2, has 
consistently positive API results during this period. The consistency of 
the low payout group API scores may indicate a weak negative dividend 
preference. Any such preference would be weak as, notwithstanding the 
lack of direction of the API scores of the high payout group, this 
group's results are indistinguishably different from those of the low 
payout group until week 6. Furthermore, due to the erratic results of 
the high payout group the cumulative difference between the results of 
the two groups does not always exceed the transaction costs to be 
incurred in acquiring and subsequently disposing of a shareholding. 
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Should the superior performance of the low payout group be indicative of 
a negative dividend preference then the time period over which the prices 
of the shares in this group adjust to their higher level requires 
comment. The API results of this group for each week (except week 2) are 
consistently positive for a period of nine weeks, after which the curve 
temporarily flattens out. Should there be a dividend effect the 
relatively extended period over which the share prices of the low payout 
group adjust is not consistent with an efficient market. 
In conclusion it may be said that the lack of direction of the API 
results of the high and intermediate payout groups in conjunction with 
the insignificant difference between the API results of the three groups 
until week 7 make the existence of any dividend effect doubtful. The 
only evidence noted in support of a negative dividend preference was the 
positive API results for the low payout group for eight of the first nine 
weeks, but the cumulative advantage of this group does no,t always exceed 
the transaction costs of acquiring and disposing of those shares. 
On the basis of the above test the existence of a dividend effect appears r 
unlikely. This tentative conclusion may require re-evaluation in the 
light of the following test. 
The null hypothesis of their being no dividend influence is therefore II 
accepted. 
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5.6.2 Dividend Groups Based on Dividend Yields 
As documented a test substantially the same as the above was conducted 
with the allocation to dividend groups undertaken on the basis of 
dividend yields rather than payout ratios. 
On conducting the latter form of the API test, it is noted that the low 
dividend yield group does not outperform the other groups over the post 
announcement 20 week period examined. The low yield group is dominated 
by the high yield group for a number of weeks but the cumulative API 
results for these groups over the full test period are insignificantly 
different. As in the previous test the intermediate group underperforms 
the other two groups. None of the API results of the groups exhibit any 
clear direction and after the initial five week period the cumulative 
difference between the groups is small. Overall, no positive or negative 
dividend preference is indicated. 
In conclusion it may be said that the results of the second API test 
reinforce those of the first, with there being very little evidence for a 
positive or negative dividend preference. 
therefore accepted. 
The null hypothesis is 
) 
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5.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
5.7.1 Model Specification 
The objective of this chapter has been to identify any dividend influence 
on the value of a firm. To achieve this objective returns on portfolios 
of share.s exhib.iting different payout patterns were examin~d. To avoid 
any possible· influence on the test results of an association between 
firms' payout policies and their risk characterist.ics the market model 
was used to adjust the security returns. It must therefore be accepted 
that the test results are conditional upon the correct specification of 
the market model as a means for adjusting ·security returns for risk. 
It may, however, be argued that any misspecification of the market model 
may no.t imply significant distortion of the final result of the API 
test. The reason for this is that it is the relative API scores of the 
payout and dividend yield groups that is of importance rather than the 
absolute level. Therefore it is possible that the results of this test 
may be fairly robust despite any misspecification of the model used. 
5.7.2 Selecti~n Bias 
A further constraining factor, common with the use of the API technique 
in an information content setting, is what has become known as a post 
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selection bias (9). In the context of this study, it may be argued that 
the dividend payout reflects the economic position of the underlying 
company and accordingly the dividend groups are characterised both by 
certain payout patterns and by firms of a particular economic standing. 
This may bias the test results. 
In conducting their cross sectional regression studies, which have been 
reported in Chapter Four, Friend and Puckett recognised this problem 
through the inclusion of a dividend supply function in their regression 
equation (10). 
The conceptual limitation discussed above relates to the validity of the 
residuals used whereas this point relates to the association between the 
hypothesis tested and the observed residuals. 
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
As stated, the purpose of this chapter . is to identify any systematic 
influence of firms' dividend policies on the returns realised on their 
securities. The initial form of the test undertaken revealed some 
evidence, though not conclusive, for a negative dividend preference on 
the part of shareholders. On repeating the test, having altered the 
basis on which securities were allocated to dividend groups, this 
evidence disappeared leading to an overall conclusion of there being 
insufficient evidence for a dividend effect. The null hypothesis of 
there being no dividend effect was therefore accepted. 
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Certain limitations of the study were then highlighted and consequently 
the results achieved must be seen as informative yet of insufficient 
strength to support a conclusion alone. Should further empirical tests 
employing more rigorous procedures indicate a similar result, then the 
results of the tests documented in this chapter may be seen as useful 
corroborative evidence. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION STUDY INTO THE EFFECTS OF 
DIVIDEND POLICY ON THE VALUE OF A FIRM 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter documents a further empirical investigation, conducted by 
the writer, into the effects of dividend policy on the value of a firm. 
The procedures to be adopted are more suited to this kind of study than 
those discussed in the previous chapter. Consequently it is hoped that 
these more complex techniques may allow stronger conclusions to be drawn 
than was possible in the preceding test. 
The test to be undertaken is a cross sectional regression study with the 
equation based on the ex post form of the CAPM introduced in Chapter 
Two. A further term has been added to test for the significance of 
dividend yield in the valuation process. An evaluation of the regression 
coefficients of this variable will permit a conclusion as to the 
existence of any dividend influence on- the value of a firm. 
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6.2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The regression equation used in this study is a modification of that 
first proposed by Fama and MacBeth for use in testing the applicability 
of the CAPM in the explanation of returns realised on shares listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange(l). For this reason and because of the 
possible interpretative background that may be provided by the results of 
their study it is felt that a review of their paper would be appropriate. 
The three testable implications of the CAPM identified by Fama and 
MacBeth, which became the hypotheses tested, were the following: 
(i) The relationship between the expected return on a security and its 
risk in any efficient portfolio is linear; 
(ii) That l3i is a complete measure of the risk of security i in an 
efficient portfolio; 
(iii) In a market of risk averse investors higher risk should be 
associated with higher expected, return. 
The regression equation used took the following form: 
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(6.1) 
Where:· Rpt = The return on portfolio p during period t, 
~pt = An estimate of the beta of portfolio p during 
period t, 
Sp = The standard deviation of the residuals of 
individual securities derived using the market 
model averaged to form portfolio estimates, 
-
Yot• Y1t,Y2t• Y3t The coefficients resulting from the above 
regression, 
Ept An error term. 
The variable ~2p is included to test the linearity of the relationship 
between the observed beta estimates and the measured return. 
Hypothesis (i) would require that E(Yzt) = 0. 
The variable Sp tests the completeness of 
Hypothesis (ii) would require that E(Y3t) = O. 
-
Pp as a risk measure. 
The coefficient Y1t measures the premium attached to risk in the pricing 
of assets. Hypothesis (iii) which posits a positive risk return trade 
off requires that E(Y1t) > O. 
Finally, the residual term ~pt is assumed to exhibit a mean of zero and 
. 
to be independent of the other variables. 
- 98 -
The assumption of weak form market efficiency, being a necessary 
condition for the operation of the CAPM, in conjunction with hypotheses 
(i) and (ii) requires the values of the terms Yzt, YJt and Ept be a fair 
game, with an expected value of zero. 
Further hypothesis (iii) together with the above assumption requires that 
~ -
the result of E(Y1t) - [E(Rm) - Rf] be a fair game also with an expected 
value of zero. The fair game property states that over a large number of 
observations expected and realized values must coincide. 
The data used in the study were monthly percentage returns of all shares 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange from January 1926 to June 1968. 
The securities were allocated to 20 portfolios on the basis of decr~asing 
beta estimates. Portfolio betas are then re-estimated using fresh data 
as described in the study undertaken by the writer. This aspect of 
research design has been closely followed by the writer for reasons 
detailed below. The remainder of the test is undertaken using shares in 
portfolios rather than individual shares. 
The monthly data used for the test consisted of annual beta estimates and 
estimates of the standard deviation of residuals for individual 
securities re-averaged by portfolio each month to allow for delistings. 
As shown in -regression equation 6.1 the portfolio return for the month 
subsequent to that used for the estimation of portfolio variables was 
regressed against those estimates of the variables. This lag effect is 
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introduced to test the association between current risk estimates and 
subsequent returns. 
Salient regress ion results are shown in Table 6 .1. The mean regression 
coefficients and the resultant t statistics are shown only for the full 
test period of 1935 to 1968. The reported t statistics have been 
calculated on the same basis as those done by the writer. The method of 
their calculation is reported below. 
TA:BLE 6.1 
S~Y OF 1,lliSl1J,.TS FOR T:HE.REGRRSSION 
- - - - -2 - -
= Yot + Y1tPp>t-l + Y2tP p>t-1 + Y3tSp,t-l +£pt 
RE GRES- MEAN REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS t STATISTIC 
SION 
- - - - - - - -NUMBER Yo Y1 Y2 Y3 T(Yo) T(Y1) T(Yz) T(Y3) 
1 ,0061 ,0085 * * 3,4X 2,S7X * * 
2 ,0049 ,0105 -,0008 * 1, 92x l,79X -,29 * 
3 ,0054 ,0072 * ,0198 2,1ox 2,2ox * ,46 
4 ,0020 ,0114 -,0026 ,0516 ,55 l,85X -,86 1, 11 
-
* regression supressed 
x significant at the 5% confidence level 
Despite statistically non significant t-test results for a number of the 
sub-periods, which have not been reported in this thesis, the overall 
results confirm the hypotheses tested. 
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Fama and MacBeth conclude that given the approximate efficiency of their 
proxy for the market portfolio, the average returns realized on common 
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange are consistent with stocks being 
priced in terms of the CAPM. 
As noted by Fama and MacBeth their conclusion is dependent on the 
efficiency of the market portfolio. This problem is known as Roll' s 
'\ 
critique and has been dealt with in Chapter Two (2). Rolls criticism 
concerning the joint hypotheses of the CAPM and the efficiency of the 
market portfolio applies both to this study and to the Hawawini 
investigation reported below together with the study undertaken by the 
writer. 
A further study which is of interest is that undertaken by Hawawini, 
Michel and Viallet on ihe Paris Stock Exchange over the period June 1969 
to May 1971(3). 
The research design is largely based on the work of Fama and MacBeth 
already reported. Modifications to the regression equation included a 
variable giving the variance of the total return on the portfolio (o 2p), 
a term giving the skewness of the distribution of returns on the 
portfolio (Skp) and a term giving the unsystematic risk of the portfolio 
The regression equation thus becomes: 
-
Y5tSkp,t-l +~pt (6.2) 
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The terms used are described above. 
The hypotheses tested were: 
{i) The relationship between a security's expected return and its. 
systematic risk is linear; i.e. E(Yzt) = O, 
(ii) Investors are compensated only for bearing systematic risk. It is 
argued that unsystematic risk may be relatively cheaply removed by 
diversification; i.e. E(YJt) = O, 
(iii) The risk return trade off is positive; i.e. E(i1t)> O, 
(iv) Investors view the distribution of securities' returns as 
symmetrica·l; i.e. E(Yst) = O, 
(v) The opportunity exists for each investor to borrow or lend 
unrestricted amounts at a risk free rate; i.e. E(Y0 t) = Rf, 
(vi) Investors may not at all times seek to construct efficient 
portfolios with unsystematic risk minimized through 
diversification; Le. E(Y4t) > o. 
To test these hypotheses a number of cross sectional regressions, as 
shown in equation 6.2, were carried out with one or more of· the variables 
suppressed in each case. 
Again the shares were allocated to portfolios on the basis of decreasing 
beta estimates with the betas recalculated annually. 
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However, portfolio returns were calculated on a weekly basis as opposed 
to monthly. This approach combined with the low trading volumes on the 
Paris Stock Exchange gives rise to the so called 'intervalling effect' 
whereby beta estimates of poorly traded shares are biased downwards. A 
method. of reducing this bias. involves using monthly rather than weekly 
returns in the estimation of .betas. 
As expected the results of the tests indicated that hypotheses (i), (ii) 
and (iv) all hold, while no evidence to support hypothesis (vi) was 
found. Hypotheses (i), (ii) and (iii) were tested by Fama and MacBeth 
(see above)-on the New York Stock Exchange where they were found to hold. 
Surprisingly hypothesis (iii) did not hold. No t statistic for the 
entire decade tested was .presented, but in all of the four years in which 
the t statistic was significant, the risk return association was 
negative. A further result of the regression, possibly connected with 
the rejection of hypothesis (iii), was that the constant term in the 
regression, Yot• exhibited on average higher values than the risk free 
rate (Rf) for which it served as a proxy. The possible connection arises 
in that the coefficient of /3 in the ex ante form of the CAPM is given by 
[E(Rm)- Rf], 
[E (Rm)- Rf] 
-therefore high regression values for Y0 t may result in 
being negative. This result implies a relative 
undervaluation of risky assets and consequent overvaluation of risk free 
assets. Such a temporary imbalance is acceptable within the framework of 
the CAPM as while from an ex ante perspective a higher return .is required 
on the market (in view of the risk) than on the risk free asset, the fair 
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game property of Y1t already discussed would permit, on a temporary 
basis, a negative return for bearing risk. This negative return, 
however, persists over the period 1970 to 1972 inclusive and appears 
again in 1978. It is the continuity of this phenomenon that leads to the 
rejection of hypothesis (iii). 
The authors offer two explanations for their findings. Firstly, they 
note the institutional dominance of the Paris Stock Exchange and argue 
the inflexibility of institutional holdings where large volumes of shares 
are not easily acquired or disposed of. This is very similar to the 
South African position and the results of this research will be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results of local research. Secondly they 
argue that the stock exchange represents only a small portion of 
available investment alternatives and that a true test of the CAPM would 
need to embrace all investment alternatives. 
In view of this explanation offered and the positive results of the other 
hypotheses tested the authors concluded that insufficient evidence exists 
for the rejection of the hypothesis that the pricing of common stocks on 
the Paris Stock Exchange conforms to the CAPM. 
6.3 DATA 
The data for the test undertaken by the writer are weekly returns on the 
shares of 107 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over a 
period of 404 weeks beginning on 26 January 1973. 
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6.4 METHOD 
6.4.l Rationale 
The CAPM is a model of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. 
Under the assumption that an asset is a constituent of an efficient 
portfolio, it therefore seeks to equate the risk of an investment in that 
asset with the expected return. Should the CAPM be the process by which 
assets are priced in markets and should the assumptions on which it is 
based hold then the suggested returns on an asset may be seen as complete 
or equilibrium returns as they recognise its systematic risk, which in 
terms of the CAPM is the only factor explaining the differences in 
expected returns between assets. 
Because it is a valuation model the CAPM in its ex post form provides a 
convenient means for assessing the returns on an asset relative to an 
empirically derived estimate of its risk. By adding further independent 
variables their impact on risk adjusted security returns may be assessed; 
although by its construction the CAPM suggests that these factors have no 
influence on return. The CAPM is, however, based on a set of fairly 
strict assumptions and to the extent that any of these are not realised, 
further factors critical to the valuation of a security may be 
introduced. 
The tests documented in this chapter are limited simultaneous tests of 
the CAPM. The tests are limited because no terms are included that might 
test the significance of risk measures other than 13 in the valuation 
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process. Further, neither the linearity of the risk return trade off nor 
investors' perceptions of the distributions 'of securities' returns are 
tested, as it is felt that these aspects fall outside the scope of the 
original hypothesis. 
The ex post form of the CAPM introduced in Chapter Two, the empirical 
market line, is therefore, with the addition of a dividend yield 
variable, considered an appropriate means of testing the impact of firms' 
dividend policies on the returns realised on their securities. 
6.4.2 Cross Sectional Regression Study 
The empirical procedures em-ployed in this study are fairly complex and 
for this reason they will be introduced in a series of steps. 
considered appropriate, diagrams will be used. 
STEP ONE - THE FORM OF. THE PROBLEM 
Where 
The objective of this study is to test, using cross sectional regression 
techniques, the impact of firms' dividend yields on the returns realised 
on their securities. This implies a regression equation of the following 
form: 
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... - - -
= Yot + Y1t Pi,t-1 + Yzt Di,t-1 + Eit (6.3) 
Where: Rit = The return on a security i during period t, 
Pi,t-1 = An estimate of the beta of share i during period t-1, 
Di,t-1 = The dividend yield of share i at the end of period t-1, 
Yot,Y1t,Y2t Coefficients estimated from the regression, 
Eit = An error term. 
It therefore becomes necessary to obtain dividend yield and beta 
estimates together with measurements of security returns so that 
concurrent observations on various securities may be used to estimate the 
regression coefficients. 
It should be noted that the research design employed tests the 
association between current security characteristics and future returns. 
Accordingly the security returns are extracted from the calendar year 
subsequent to that from which the security characteristics were drawn. 
STEP TWO - PORTFOLIO FORMATION 
Tests of this kind are, however, normally undertaken using shares in 
portfolios rather than individual shares (4). The reason is that beta 
est·imates are subject to measurement error. By grouping shares into 
portfolios these estimation errors are largely offset. This results in 
portfolio beta estimates being more reliable than the estimates 
pertaining to the individual securities. 
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The first step in the formation of portfolios involves the estimation of 
a beta for each security. This was achieved through the use of 
Markowitz' s market model whereby weekly security returns for the first 
100 weeks of data were regressed against the co~responding returns on the 
Rand Daily Mail (RDM) index (5). Shares were then assigned to ten 
portfolios on the basis of decreasing beta estimates such that the first 
and last portfolios had thirteen and fourteen shares respectively while 
the other eight portfolios each had ten shares. The rest of this test is 
then conducted using these shares in portfolios rather than individual 
securities. The composition of these portfolios remains constant over 
the entire test. The securities used and the portfolios to which they 
have been allocated are shown in Appendix One. 
This portfolio formation period has been demonstrated graphically on a 
time scale in Figure 6.1. 
The accumulation of shares into portfolios based on decreasing beta 
estimates raises a further problem in that research by Blume indicates 
that beta estimates for high risk securities tend to be overstated while 
those for low risk securities tend to be understated (6). Grouping 
shares on the basis of decreasing betas results in the portfolios 
exhibiting biases similar to those of their constituent shares. This 
problem is to some extent alleviated by the annual re-estimation of 
portfolio betas. As the security betas within each portfolio gradually 
change over time their estimation errors become random and the desired 
offsetting effect occurs. 
STEP 
TWO 
FOUR 
SIX 
YEARS 
WEEKS 
Portfolio 
Formation 
~ -------------------- --- -- ---
FIGURE 6.1 
ESTIMATION PERIODS FOR PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS FOR 1977 '.[EST PERIOD 
-197 5-- -1976-. ------------.i. 977 _______________ _ 
100 152 
. 204 208 i12 216 220 224 228 232 236 240 244 248 252 256 
Beta 
Estimation 
Div Yield 
Estimation 
Measurement of Portfolio Returns 
-- -- --· 
-- --
I 
0 
00 
I 
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It is necessary to allocate shares to portfolios on the basis of 
decreasing beta estimates so that these portfolios will display a wide 
range of betas similar to those displayed by securities. 
A series of cross-sectional regressions will be carried out using 
equations similar to equation 6.3. Each regression will have ten 
observations being concurrent measurements of the regression variables 
taken on the ten portfolios. 
STEP THREE - ESTIMATION OF RISK AND DIVIDEND CHARACTERISTICS 
The following step involves the estimation of risk and dividend 
characteristics for each of the portfolios. These a,re to serve as the 
independent variables in the cross sectional regressions. The discussion 
will initially be framed in terms of the data requirements for one 
regression calculation with the explanation subsequently expanded to 
present the full test. 
Bearing in mind that the investigation is now framed in terms of shares 
in portfolios rather than individual shares, regression equation 6.3 may 
be written as : 
(6.4) 
Where the subscript p is read as denoting portfolio p. 
The first regression will require concurrent beta estimate and dividend 
yield observations from each of the 10 portfolios. 
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These portfolio estimates were derived by taking a simple average of the 
measurements for the individual securities. 
Individual security beta estimates were calculated by means of the market 
model whereby weekly security returns were regressed against the weekly 
returns on the RDM index. This was performed over the 104 week (2 year) 
interval from week 101 to week 204 inclusive. The pe,riod over which the 
ten portfolio beta estimates have been made for the first regression is 
shown in Figure 6.1. 
Dividend yields for each share were then calculated for the year 1976. 
This was done by dividing the sum of the final and interim dividends 
paid, in respect of the financial year end .falling within 1976, by the 
share price at the end of the eleventh week subsequent .to the end of the 
financial year. Eleven weeks after the year end is approximately two and 
a half months by which time it is assumed that the final earnings and 
dividend information had been released. 
It is acknowledged that this method of estimation of dividend yields is 
somewhat · arbitrary, but it is submitted that there is no reason to 
suspect that any significant distortion of test results will arise out of 
this procedure. The period over which the ten portfolio dividend yields 
have been estimated for the first regression is shown in Figure 6.1. 
This concludes the data for the independent variables for one regression 
calculation with ten observations. 
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STEP FOUR - CALCULATION OF PORTFOLIO RETURNS 
Measurements of concurrent returns are required fo'r each of the ten 
portfolios for use as the dependent variable in the regression. The 
required portfolio returns are calculated by averaging the returns for 
the individual securities. For the purposes of this test, portfolio 
returns are calculated over four week periods. 
To conduct the first regression a return for each of the ten portfolios 
is calculated in the manner described over the interval from week 205 to 
208 inclusive. The estimation period is shown in Figure 6.1. 
STEP FIVE - STATEMENT OF CROSS -SECTIONAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
The regression equations used were 
(regression equation one) 
(regression equation three) 
-~ot, 
Coefficients arising from the 
regression. 
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It is noted that the estimation of betas undertaken in step three 
involved the regression of weekly security returns against the weekly 
returns on the RDM Index. As weekly data has been used the resultant 
beta estimates are marked with a superscript w. 
The other terms used in these equations have been explained above. 
STEP SIX - EXECUTION OF REGRESSIONS 
The first regression, using regression equation two, with concurrent 
observations from each of the ten portfolios was then conducted. This 
yielded one set of regression co-efficients. The regressions were 
calculated using a set of computer programmes known as BMDP lR (7). 
Ten further concurrent portfolio returns were then calculated, as set out 
above, over the interval from week 209 to week 212. Using precisely the 
same estimates of the independent variables a further regression with ten 
observations was carried out. 
This procedure is carried out thirteen times in all using the same 
estimates of independent variables with the ten concurrent portfolio 
returns being measured over successive four week periods. This is shown 
graphically in Figure 6.1. 
The thirteen consecutive four week periods over which the ~ortfolio 
returns have been measured corresponds to the calendar year 1977. 
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Thus as is evident from Figure 6.1, the returns realised on the 
portfol.ios during 1977 have been regressed on beta estimates calculated 
over 1975 and 1976 and dividend yield estimates calculated over 1976. 
This has resulted in thirteen sets of regression coefficients. 
The full procedure outlined in this step was then repeated using 
regression equations one and three. 
STEP SEVEN - SIGNIFICANCE TESTS OF REGRESSION.GOEFFICIENTS 
The 13 coefficients, in respect of each variable, resulting from the 
above regressions have been tested for significance by means of the 
t-test, specified as follows: 
t statistic = 
N 
1 L: Ai 
N i=l 
var 
N 
Where: N = The number of observations, 
At - The individual observations, 
N 
X 1 L: Ai, 
N i=l 
N 
VAR [ L: (Ai- X) 2] I (N-1). 
i=l 
A t statistic greater than the figure extracted from the appropriate 
table at N-1 degrees of freedom and the chosen confidence level indicates 
that the factor represented by the coefficient may be viewed as a 
determinant of the value of a firm or as being correlated with a 
determinant of a firm's value. 
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STEP EIGHT - EXTENSION OF CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS 
As stated in section 6.3 the full data set for this study comprises 
weekly returns over a 404 week period for 107 firms listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This is shown diagramatically on a time 
scale in Figure 6.2 on which the tests documented on Figure 6.1 have been 
shown. 
Noting that the compositicin of the portfolios remains constant the 
procedures in steps three to seven were then repeated after having 
advanced the time scale by one year. This gave rise to another thirteen 
regression coeffici~nts covering the calendar year 1978 for each variable 
which were tested for significance by means of the t-test. 
The repetition of steps three to seven was performed a third and fourth 
time, each after advancing the time scale by a further year. As the 
portfolio returns are measured over 4 week intervals (see step four) and 
since the full data set covers only 44 weeks of 1980, the fourth 
iteration produced only eleven regression coefficients. These last two 
sets of regression results eorrespond to the calendar years 1979 and 1980 
respectively. 
The period over which the independent variables and the portfolio returns 
have been measured for the extension of the regression procedures is 
shown in Figure 6.2. 
t statistics were calculated on the results of the extended regression 
procedures according to the formula set out in step seven. Furthermore, 
t statistics for each variable over the full test period from the 
beginning of 1977 to week 44 of 1980 were calculated. 
Reference 
Figure 
6.1 
Step 
Second 
Iteration 
Eight Third 
Iteration 
Fourth 
Iteration 
FIGURE 6.2 
ESTIMATION PERIODS FOR PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS FOR FULL TEST PERIOD 
YEARS 
WEEKS 
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\.Jl 
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STEP NINE - BACKGROUND TO A FURTHER TEST 
As discussed below, for a number of the sub-periods and for the entire 
test span the average regression coefficients of the beta term were 
negative. The implications of this result are contrary to our 
expectations. Consider equation 6.3 whe.re, with a negative value for 
Y1 t, increasingly positive values for l3i, t-1 would, with other factors 
held constant, imply corresponding decreases in Rit• 
risk investments appear to offer lower returns. 
Therefore higher 
This research result was noted whether the portfolio returns were 
regressed on the beta estimates only or on the beta and dividend yield 
estimates. Although unusual this result has been obtained by other 
researchers (8). 
The negative coefficients for the beta term may be attributable to the 
'intervalling effect' noted in the Hawawini study. This effect arises 
where the trading volume on a share over a period is low resulting in the 
return on that share not reflecting market wide factors. Accordingly the 
beta, being a measure of the shares responsiveness to market wide 
factors, is biased downwards. Efforts to minimize the 'intervalling 
effect' centre on ensuring that the trading volume of shares giving rise 
to the portfolio return· to be regressed on the selected index, is 
sufficient to ensure that the portfolio return is as far as possible 
reflective of market wide influences. Therefore as mentioned above 
increasing the interval over which portfolio betas are to be measured is 
a method of achieving this. 
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STEP TEN - RE-ESTIMATION OF PORTFOLIO BETAS 
To minimise the influence of the 'intervalling effect' on the regression 
results, the full regression test (steps three to eight) was repeated 
after having re-estimated the portfolio betas. 
Portfolio betas were originally calculated in step three by averaging 
estimates for individual securities. Beta estimates for individual 
securities were calculated by regressing weekly security returns against 
weekly returns on the ROM index over the years 1975 and 1976 as shown in 
figure 6.1. 
The portfolio betas were first re-estimated by regressing portfolio 
returns measured over four week periods against the returns measured on 
the RDM index for similar intervals. This estimation was again made over 
1975 and 1976 to provide data for the first thirteen regressions. 
Portfolio betas were then calculated using a further method. Instead of 
regressing portfolio returns measured over four week periods against the 
return on the ROM index, these returns were regressed on an index 
representing a simple average of the returns on the 107 selected firms. 
This latter index is known as the internal index. 
The possibility of excluding the returns on a particular portfolio from 
the internal index when regressing the returns on that portfolio against 
the internal index was considered. In view of the extension of empirical 
procedures required this was not pursued although this would provide an 
interesting area for future research. 
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Beta estimates for the previous test derived using the RDM index are a 
measure of the sensitivity of individual security returns relative to the 
returns on the market. The weighted average of the beta estimates for 
all securities traded on a market would approximate one. However, as 
only 107 firms were sampled, the weighted average of their beta estimates 
is likely to be different from one. 
average regression coefficients of 
This may result in distortion of the 
the beta term. Portfolio betas 
estimated using the internal index, however, represent a measure of 
sensitivity of the portfolio's return relative to the changes in the 
return of the shares of the 107 selected firms. The average of any ten 
concurrent portfolio beta estimates derived using the internal index 
would approximate one. Use of the internal index would therefore remove 
this possible bias. 
STEP ELEVEN - RE-STATEMENT OF CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
As a result of the re-estimation of the beta terms using the two methods 
outlined, the following restatement of the regression equations is 
required: 
Rpt = ~ot + ~lt ~mp,t-1 + $ztDp,t-1+ ept(regression equation four) 
(regression equation five)' 
(regression equation seven) 
Where: pmp,t-1 = The beta of 
using monthly 
pmip,t-1= The beta of 
using monthly 
l?ot• ht, ~2t, 
0ot> 0lt> Tot> 
Tit, T2t• Wot> 
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portfolio p estimated during period 
data and the RDM index, 
portfolio p estimated during period 
data and the internal index, 
= Coefficients estimated from the regressions. 
Other terms as used above. 
t-1 
t,-1 
Before proceeding with the regression results table 6.2 is presented 
which summarises the regression equations used and the method of 
calculation of the variables. 
Regression Dependent Independent 
Equation Variable Variables 
ONE pw 
I Portfolio TWO pw -D 
Returns 
Calculated 
-THREE D 
Over Four 
-FOUR 13m D 
Week 
FIVE pm 
Intervals 
- -SIX 13mi D 
SEVEN ~mi 
TABLE 6.2 
REGRESSION SUMMARY 
Method of Calculation of 
Independent Variable 
Beta Estimate Dividend Yield Estimate 
NIA 
Regression of weekly security 
returns on return on ROM Index Total dividends paid in respect 
over two year interval. of financial year end falling 
Security estimates averaged within any calender year 
to form portfolio estimates. divided by share price at the -
end of the eleventh week subse-
quent t;o the financial year end. 
NIA As for regression equation two 
Regression of monthly port-
folio returns on return on As for regression equation two 
RDM Index over two year 
interval. 
NIA 
Regression of monthly port-
folio returns on return on As for regression equation two 
internal index over two year 
interval. 
NIA 
Result 
Reported 
in Table 
6.3 
6.4 
N 
0 
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6.5. HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses to be tested using the procedures outlined above are: 
(i) That there exists a positive risk-return tradeoff on securities; 
i.e., 
..... - - - -
H E(~lt), E(Y1t), E(¢1t), E(81t), E{T1t), E{w1tl > 0. 
as against the alternative hypothesis; 
H': EC€1t), E(Y1t), E(¢1t), E(81d, E(T1t), E(~ltl ~ O. 
(See regression equations one, two, four, five, six and seven.) 
(ii) That the dividend yield of a security does not influence the return 
realised on that security; i.e., 
- -H E(Yzt), E(81t), E(¢2tl, E(Tztl o. 
as against the alternative hypothesis; 
H': E(Yzt), E(§1t), E(~zt>• E{fztl ~ o. 
(See regression equations two, three, four and six.) 
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6.6. TEST RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
6.6.1 Results of Cross Sectional Regressions 
We now consider the outcome of the cross sectional regressions. The 
results of the regressions using the first three equations are shown in 
Table 6. 3. Average regressi.on coeffi.cients and their t statistics are 
reported individually for 1977, 1978, 1979 and the first 44 weeks of 
1980. The average regression coefficients for the full test period and 
the associated t statistics are also reported. 
Regression 
Interval 
1977 
1978 
1979 
44 weeks 
of 1980 
Full test 
period 
- 123 -
TABLE 6.3 
CROSS ~ECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Statistic 
-
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Statistic 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Stastistic 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Statistic 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
t Statistic 
jRegression Regression Regression 
I Equation Equation Equation 
One Two Three 
INDEPENDENT REGRESSION VARIABLE 
Beta Beta Divide!_ld Divide.!ld 
(~W) [ 13w] Yield(D] Yield(D] 
,00260 ,00450 ,17217 ,15742 
,27412 ,49903 1,09302 ,94983 
-,01216 -,01262 ,03054 -,06803 
-1,04860 -1,03566 , 20877 -,47319 
,01438 ,0109 ,52205 ) 58892 
,97609 ,70169 1,73518 2,18384* 
-,01036 -,00408 ,20960 ,23010 
-,41383 -, 17744 ,87170 ,75417 
-,00102 -,00037 ,23545 ,23106 
-,12852 -, 04774 2, 10492* 2,11167* 
*Statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level. 
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As discussed the regression using regression equation one is based on the 
ex post version of the CAPM and is a limited test of that model. 
Therefore, should the original fair game assumption hold, the regression 
coefficients of beta should on average represent the 'price' of risk 
being the difference between the mark.et return and the return on the risk 
free asset (Rm-Rf). Further, in terms of the CAPH one would expect this 
term to be positive, implying a posit.ive risk return trade off. Turning 
to the results of this regression we note negative coefficients for beta 
dQring the second and fourth subperiods and for the entire test period. 
The obvious explanation that the CAPM prices assets on the basis of 
expect·ed returns and that the model tolerates discrepa,ncies between 
expected and realized values does not seem adequate when one notes the 
extended period of the negative risk return trade off. In this situation 
one would expect riskier assets to be bid down so that the risk return 
equilibrium is restored. It should be noted, however, th.at the average 
regression coefficient of beta for the full test period is only just 
negative and in terms of the t-test result, is insignificantly different 
from zero. The actual premium offered for bearing risk may therefore be 
zero or marginally positive, but in any event it is not likely to be 
significant on a statistical basis. 
Turning to the results arising from the use of regression equation two 
the position in regard to beta is similar to that noted in regression 
one. Again none of the t statistics for the subperiods or for the entire 
test period are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
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It is interesting to. compare the beta regression coeffici.ents ari.si.ng 
from the use of regression equation one and regressi.on equation two. 
Except in the second subperiod these vary materially between the two sets 
of results. Despite this the broad pattern between the two is preserved 
i.n that none of the beta regression coefficients i.s significant and the 
magnitude of "the coef fi.cients and their sign is the same throughout. 
This implies that little distort ion of the regression coefficients for 
beta arises through the introduction of a dividend yield term. 
Therefore, the limited test of the CAPM has shown that the postulated 
positive risk return trad~ off is not iri evidence. One should remember, 
however, that the beta e-stimates used in this study were derived ftom 
weekly data which renders them open to bias from the 'intervalling 
effect'. The validity of these regression coefficients· is therefore not 
assured. 
The coefficients and the resultant t statistics .derived for the dividend 
yield terms arising from the use of regression equations two and three 
are generally of the same magnitude. The regression coefficients for the 
full test period are in both cases statistically significant at the 5% 
level of confidence as is the coefficient for the third subperiod where 
regression equation three was used. 
The generally positive regression coefficients show a posi.tive 
association between dividend yield and return,which indicates an aversion 
for dividends. By observing equation 6.4 it may readily be observed why 
. !'" 
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positive regression coefficients for the dividend yield term imply a 
distaste for dividends. A positive value for Y2t means that with other 
terms held constant the higher the dividend yield on a portfolio the 
higher the required rate of return. This implies that investors require 
a higher overall return on the securities of dividend paying firms to 
compensate for the form of return. 
The noted negative dividend preference may not be conclusive in view of 
the non significant t-test results for three of the four sub-periods. 
In any event the possible distortion of beta estimates arising through 
the 'intervalling effect' may be expected to disturb the regression 
coefficients of the dividend yield terms. Accordingly the results of 
this test may best be evaluated in conjunction with results of subsequent 
' 
tests in which the 'interval1ing effect' has been controlled for. 
As discussed the preceding test was repeated using two sets of new beta 
estimates. In both cases monthly data were used to obtain these 
estimates. One set was derived using the RDM index while the other used 
the internal index. Use of monthly data for calculation of beta 
estimates minimizes the 'intervalling effect' while use of the internal 
index should prevent any distortion in the regression coefficients 
arising from incomplete sampling. The average regression coefficients 
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and the t statistics arising from the regressions using these amended 
beta estimates are reported in Table 6 .4 on the same basis as in the 
previous test. 
Comparing the values of. the average regression coefficients of the beta 
estimates derived using monthly data as opposed to weekly data (Table 6.3 
regression equation one (weekly data) and Table 6.4 regression equation 
five (monthly data), both using RDM index) one notes that the average 
regression coefficients are in all cases higher where monthly data has 
been used. Further the average regression coefficient over the full test 
period now becomes positive although it is statistically significant only 
at the 25% confidence level. The average regression coefficients are, 
however, still negative for two of the subperiods. As noted in the 
discussion on the previous cross sectional regression study a temporarily 
realized negative return for bearing risk does not necessarily lead to a 
rejection of the CAPM. Therefore at the 25% confidence level a positive 
risk return trade off as required by the CAPM is established for two of 
the individually reported test periods and for the full test period. The 
comparison •of the results achieved using the different estimation 
intervals indicates that the beta estimates used in the first study were 
likely to have been biased to some extent by the 'intervalli.ng effect'. 
TABLE 6.4 
CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Regression • Regress ion. Regression ' Regression 
Equation Equation Equation Equation 
Four Five Six Seven 
INDEPENDENT REGRESSION VARIABLE 
Regression Beta Dividend Beta Beta Dividend Beta 
Interval [~ml Yield [D] (~ml [~mi] Yield col l~mi] 
Average Regression 
1977 Coefficient ,00901 ,15642 ,00904 ,00965 , 14927 ,01062 
T Statistic ,78631 ,93907 ,79199 ,86037 ,84628 ,98279 
Average Regression 
1978 Coefficient ·-, 01088 -,02545 -,01113 -,00609 -,03560 -,00659 
T Statistic -,78521 -,18571 -,89937 -,48372 -,12418 -,52913 
Average Regression 
1979 Coefficient ,00744 '71432 ,04492 ,01043 ,64936 ,00541 
T Stastistic J 60271 2,86343* ,97478 ,56719 2,32779* ,29148 
Average Regression 
44 weeks Coefficient ,00364 ,22615 -,00309 ,00105 ,24162 -,00426 
of 1980 
T Statistic ,19031 '71030 -,16739 ,07580 ,79413 -,30745 
Full test Average Regression 
period Coefficient ,00225 ,26953 ,01045 ,00387 ,25159 ,00152 
\ T Statistic ,32891 2,51601* ,80534 ,55660 2,28228* ,21934 
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
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The average regression coefficient for beta. arising from the use of 
regression equation seven (beta estimates derived using the internal 
index), reveals a marginally positive statistically non significant risk 
return trade off over the complete test interval. As already discussed 
these beta estimates result from the regression of portfolio returns 
against the return on the entire 107 firm sample. To the extent that the 
return on this sample is not representative of the market return, the 
beta estimates would not be true. This is a probable cause of the low 
average regression coefficient of the beta term. 
Turning to regressions four and six where a dividend yield term has been 
added we note statistically non significant positive average values for 
the coefficients of the beta term over the full test period. We· also 
note that the broad pattern of these regression coefficients between the 
two·equations is similar in that for each of the separately reported test 
intervals the signs of the coefficients are the same and none are 
statistically significant. 
The introduction of a dividend yield term has resulted in three of the 
four subsidiary intervals exhibiting positive regreS$ion coefficients for 
the beta term as opposed to only two where no dividend yield term was 
included. The remaining subsidiary interval exhibited negative 
regression coefficients for all variables in all four of the equations 
whose results are reported in Table 6.4. For this reason the results for 
this interval are of doubtful validity. 
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On the basis of the results achieved using regression equation five 
(Table 6.4) where beta estimates have been. made using monthly data and 
the RDM index it may be said that in two subsidiary intervals and over 
the full test period a positive risk return trade off as required by the 
CAPM was noted. Over the full test period this relationship was 
statistically significant only at the 25% confidence level. 
Unfortunately this significance did not extend to the results achieved 
using regression equation four where the dividend yield term was 
included. The low confidence level and the existence of an observed 
negative coefficient for beta has been observed both on American equity 
markets by Schallheim and De Magistris and on the Paris Stock Exchange by 
Hawawini et al (9). 
The explanations offered by Hawawini et al have been discussed. Briefly 
they argue that, with the Paris Stock Exchange dominated by institutions, 
changes in underlying fundamentals are not always reflected in security 
prices and further that low trading volumes do not permit institutional 
flexibility. This situation is very similar to that prevalent on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Secondly they note that the stock exchange 
is but one investment alternative and that a true test of the CAPM would 
require a broader spectrum of investment options. In view of this and 
the generally positive risk return trade off noted in the results 
reported in Table 6. 4 we may conclude that the pricing of shares on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange is not inconsistent with the CAPM. 
Finally it may be concluded that although the variety of methods used to 
estimate the beta variables for the regressions did not always 
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result in statistically significant positive regression coefficients, 
our null hypothesis of there being a positive risk return trade off is 
accepted. 
The use of beta estimates based on monthly rather than weekly data has 
affected the period by period regression coefficents of the dividend 
yield term, but over the entire test period the regression coefficients 
achieved have remained statistically significant at the 5% level of 
confidence. Any bias introduced into the beta estimates by the 
'intervalling effect' has therefore not fundamentally affected the 
regression coefficients of the dividend yield term. 
The estimation of beta coefficients using the internal index rather than 
the RDM index has also not materially affected the regression results for 
the dividend yield term. 
The overall significance of the dividend yield term resulting from the 
use of regression equations four and six is largely a result of the high 
value of the coefficient for 1979. During 1979 share prices on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange increased dramatically with the RDM index 
rising from 275 to 448, an increase of 63%. With the realized portfolio 
returns for 1979 being regressed against the parameters for the preceding 
year it is possible that the dividend yield term served as a proxy for 
the strong market growth during that year. Accordingly it is the writers 
opinion that any true dividend aversion may not be as significant as 
implied by the subperiod three results. 
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·The regression coefficients of the dividend yield term during the other 
sub-periods indicate a positive association between dividend yield and 
return in two out of three cases as well as over the average of these 
three subperiods (reported in Table 6.5). This relationsh.ip is only 
significant at the 20% level of confidence indicating a weakly 
established distaste for dividends. 
One would expect the coefficients of the dividend yi~ld term to be fairly 
constant over time thus indicating a consistent effect of dividend yield 
on return• This was not observed. 
The dividend yield variables actually used in the regressions are,· 
however, measurements taken at a particular point in time and therefore 
are estimates of the actual dividend yield for any particular year. The 
actual dividend yield varies both with fluctuations in security prices 
and as dividends are declared in respect of securities and as those 
securities subsequently go ex-dividend. This may cause the noted 
variability in the regression coefficients of the dividend yield term. 
Finally it may be said that the regression results for the dividend yield 
term probably imply, for reasons already documented, a stronger positive 
association between dividend yield and before tax return than is actually 
the case. 
observed. 
Nevertheless a statistically significant association was 
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TABLE 6.5 
AVERAGE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE DIVIDEND YIELD TERMS 
OVER THE PERIOD JANUARY 1977 TO NOVEMBER 1980 WITII 1979 EXCLUDED 
Average Regression 
Coefficient 
T Statistic 
Table 6.4 Table 6.4 
Regression Regression 
.Equation Four Equation Six 
··INDEPENDENT REGRESSION VARI:ABLE 
Di.vidend Dividend 
Yield Yield 
) 11325 ,11177 
,96336 ,97175 
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Our null hypothesis of there being no influence of dividend yield on 
security returns is therefore rejected. 
' 
6.6.2. Comparison of Result::; Achieved Using the Two Methods 
At this stage a comparison of the results achieved using the API 
technique with those arising. from the cross sectional regression 
equations would be informative. The API technique revealed a superior 
performance of the low payout group where the allocation to dividend 
groups was undertaken on the basi.s of payout ratios. Thi.s result was 
discounted for a number of reasons including the disappearance of the 
noted effect where the test was repeated wi.th ·the allocation to dividend 
groups undertaken on the basis of dividend yield. 
conclusion of no dividend effect was recoided. 
Thus an overall 
The results of the cross sectional regression equations revealed a 
negative dividend preference. In view of the conceptual limitations 
attaching to the use of the API technique in a valuation context, greater 
significance must be accorded to the results of the cross sectional 
regression study and a probable overall conclusion of a positive 
association between dividend yield and before tax return is noted • 
• 
6.6.3 
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This result does not necessarily imply that given perfect capital markets 
the dividend policy of a firm will affect its value as the noted effect 
may result from taxes or other market imperfections, which in aggregate 
would induce investors to favour certain payout ratios. Should the noted 
dividend aversion be genuine it implies either a complete denial of the 
CAPM or that market imperfections are of such significance that 
disadvantaged securities are obliged to offer higher returns to 
compensate for these imperfections. In either case an amendment to the 
pre tax form of the CAPM is required. The reader is referred back to 
Chapter Three where alterations to the CAPM were proposed by Brennan in 
recognition of the difference in effective tax rates applicable to 
dividends and capital gains. 
Clientele Effects 
It is, however, possible that these market imperfections may bias 
individual shareholder's investment decisions in favour of certain payout 
ratios to a greater extent than implied by the results of the cross 
sectional regression tests. 
The reason for this is that investors are likely to alter their 
investment decisions, in a manner consistent with a clientele effect, so 
as to minimise their costs arising from market imperfections. For 
example investors experiencing a high marginal rate of taxation would be 
ex~ected to hold securities offering a low dividend yield. 
I 
\ 
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Nevertheless a negative dividend preference was observed which, being 
more likely to have arisen from market imperfections than from a dividend 
aversion in a perfect capital markets situation, signifies investors 
inability or unwillingness to remove market imperfections by amending 
their investment policies. 
It is, however, possible that a negative dividend preference such as that 
noted in this study is not inconsistent with a clientele effect. Should 
the clientele effect in fact apply in ~elation to different capital gains 
and income tax rates, investors operating under a dividend yield 
constraint would tend to accumulate shares at varying points on the 
payout spectrum depending on their tax status. Black and Scholes argue 
that the introduction of such a constraint in portfolio construction may 
divert effort from attaining adequate investment diversification and 
accordingly, in the absence of sophisticated estimation techniques, may 
result in excessive risk levels in investor portfolios (10). 
Should the observed dividend aversion arise from market imperfections 
rather than from an aversion in a perfect capital markets situation then 
its existence may be justified despite the clientele effect. The reason 
for this is that the potential reduction in taxes possible through 
investment decisions being influenced by firms' dividend yields may be 
insufficient to offset the resultant cost of imperfect portfolio 
diversification. 
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This conclusion as ·to the logical co-existence of a dividend and 
clientele effect presumes that no other opportunities exist for the 
neutralization of any tax differential. Miller and Scholes in the 
context of American tax laws, observe the possibility of minimizing or 
reducing tax on dividends through a combination of borrowing and personal 
insurance (11). Although the range of opportunities and the extent of 
the relief available in South Africa is more limited, the neutralization 
of the tax on a limited amount of dividend income is possible. Briefly, 
through a combination of personal borrowing and membership of pension and 
retirement annuity funds shareholders are able to generate sufficient tax 
deductions to avoid the liability for tax on a reasonable amount of 
dividends. Effectively dividend income is set off against these payments 
on which the tax deduction in the case of pension funds is limited to the 
greater of Rl750 or 7~% of the remuneration derived from retirement 
funding employment (12). The permitted deduction in respect of 
contributions to retirement annuity funds is the greatest of: 
(i) 15% of income received from non retirement funding employment or 
(ii) Rl 750 or 
(iii) R3 500 less the amount claimed in respect of contributions to 
pension funds. 
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Subject to certain limitations the ultimate lump sum payments from these 
funds are tax free. Through this medium natural persons are in a 
position to neutralise the taxation attaching to dividend income. For 
this reason qualifying investors may ignore the dividend policy of a 
prospective investee. The noted dividend aversion, to the extent that it 
derives from a taxation effect, does therefore not appear to have a 
logical basis as in the hands of companies dividends are tax exempt while 
dividend receipts by natural persons may be neutralised through the 
medium described above. There is no difference in the effective rates of 
taxation of capital gains and dividends in the hands of long term 
insurers. 
The investigation into the effects of dividend yield on stock prices by 
Black and Scholes on American Stock markets provides evidence in support 
of the clientele effect (13). In their study the coefficients for the 
dividend term in the pricing equation were estimated over the period 1936 
to 1966 and for a number of subperiods. In each case this coefficient 
was found to be positive and insignificantly different from zero. One of 
the subperiods covered the period 1940 to 1945, during which time the 
rates of tax were markedly increased to finance war expenditure. This 
increase in the tax rates would imply a lower net return from high payout 
shares and a higher dividend coefficient in that study. However, this 
was not observed indicating that investors holding shares whose dividends 
were subject to the increased tax, had a nil or very low effective tax 
rate on such dividends. 
effect. 
This_ result is consistent with a clientele 
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A further study of interest in this regard was a test by Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy who measured the effective excess marginal rate of taxation on 
dividends over that levied on capital gains (14). This study is reported 
in Chapter Four. Noting that the actual rates of taxation on dividends 
and capital gains differ under American tax law, their study by 
implication tests the success of investors' attempts to neutralise those 
taxes. Results of this test and an associated test of a clientele effect 
revealed evidence consistent with a clientele effect but also evidence of 
a fairly strong negative dividend preference arising from the tax 
differential on dividend income and capital gains. Miller and Scholes 
criticised the procedures used to control for the information content of 
dividends and noted no dividend effect on reperforming the test with 
suitably amended data (15). 
It may therefore be said that the results of tests on American equity 
markets indicate the existence of clientele effects. The overall 
empirical result in this study of there being a positive association 
between dividend yield and return thus implying a distaste for dividends 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the normative position set out in 
Chapter Three, especially in view of the possibility of numerous 
relatively affluent individual investors whose dividend income exceeds 
the allowable pension and retirement annuity deductions and who therefore 
would have a genuine dividend aversion. 
Furthermore, in view of there being no strong market wide negative 
dividend preference for three of the four individually reported periods 
and considering the payout preferences of investors, which must exist 
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because of their tax profiles, the results of this study are consistent 
with the existence of a clientele effect and other factors used for 
neutralising the taxation on dividends. 
6.6.4 The Information Content of Dividends 
A frequent criticism of previous tests where generous dividend payments 
have been held to positively affect the value of a firm has been that the 
large distribution of earnings does not of itself affect the value of a 
firm, but rather that these large payments are indicative of management's 
expectations of sound prospects for the firm. In this case, where the 
relationship between dividends and before tax return is positive thus 
implying a distaste for dividends, it may be said that over the test 
period no price sensitive information is conveyed by dividend payments. 
This is generally consistent with the findings of Watts on American 
equity markets reported in Chapter Four (16) and of the findings of 
Knight and Affleck-Graves on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (17). 
6.7. POSSIBLE BIASING INFLUENCES 
6.7.1 The Interrelationship of Investment and Dividend Decisions 
A further point of concern is the effect of changes in the amount of 
investment on the level of dividend distribution. Any such effect noted 
does not violate the Miller and Modigliani requirement for the value of a 
firm to be invariant with respect to dividend changes, namely that the 
investment decision be independent of the dividend decision. The point 
is that should dividend distributions mirror the results of independently 
determined investment changes it is difficult to decide whether the 
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aversion noted in the cross sectional regression tests results from a 
negative dividend preference or from investment changes which are 
negatively correlated with the dividend payout. 
Classification as a high or low payout or yield share for use in the API 
technique may respectively be the result of abandoning or taking up large 
investment projects. Similarly the dividend yields of the portfolios 
used in the cross sectional regressions may also have been affected by 
dramatic changes in the investments of the underlying firms. In the 
latter case, the negative effects of such changes may not be as marked 
since the dividend yield of each share comprises approximately 10% of the 
dividend yield of a portfolio. Furthermore, should significant changes 
in the level of investments affect the payout ratio, the possibility of 
the offsetting of the investment changes of the firms in a portfolio 
would exert a stabilising influence on the dividend yield of that 
portfolio. 
Nevertheless the possibility of an association between investment and 
dividend changes may give the impression of a dividend effect where in 
fact there is none. 
The solution to this problem may well be found in the discussion on the 
dividend setting process' reported above. In this discussion, on the 
basis of a number of interviews, Lintner reported that the maintenance of 
an established dividend policy generally took precedence over a 
satisfactory liquidity position and current f~asible investment projects 
( 18). This being so no distortion of the test results would be 
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expected. However, the results of Lintner' s interviews are specific to 
American equity markets and the firms were selected for analysis 
according to specific characteristics rather than on a random basis. 
Accordingly Lintner's investigation does not allow firm conclusions to be 
drawn. 
The dividend history of the firms used in the cross sectional regression 
investigations were reviewed for the period 1973 to 1980. The prevailing 
pattern was that of a steadily increasing trend in per share dividends 
with a number of firms displaying periods of static dividends. The few 
noted cases of reduction in the dividend occured mostly in tandem with 
large earnings reversals, but these were few. Furthermore, the period 
1978 to 1980 was a period of. vigorous growth where many profitable 
investment opportunities would have arisen, yet strong dividend increases 
were noted. 
The relatively less prosperous interval from 1975 to 1977, while 
producing less marked dividend increases, showed equally few reductions 
other than those associated with a large decline in earnings. This 
provides evidence in a South Africa context of the insensitivity of 
dividend payments to investment changes. A further useful example is 
that of SAPPI LTD who, despite originally budgeted capital expenditure in 
excess of R800 million over the period 1982 to 1985, has seen fit to 
maint~in its dividend. It may therefore be said that, in view of the 
apparent limited effect of investment financing requirements on the level 
of dividend payments, empirical results showing a dividend effect are 
unlikely to be attributable to investment changes. 
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This conclusion is strengthened by the parallel observations of Lintne~ 
in the American situation. 
The possible interpretative difficulties which would arise if the 
dividend decision were influenced by investment considerations is part of 
a broader problem concerning the causality between observed effects and 
identified variables. The results of cross sectional regression studies 
are open to attack on the grounds that the independent variable is not a 
determinant of the dependent variable but merely that it is correlated 
with a true determinant. In this study the two most significant factors 
critical to the valuation process and related to the payout policy are 
risk and the effect of changes in investment. Other than these, which 
have been discussed and controlled for, no further significant potential 
biasing factors are known to the writer. 
Recent work on arbitrage pricing theory (APT), originally introduced by 
Ross, however, indicates the possibility of a range of factors critical 
to the valuation of firms' securities (19). APT may be seen as an 
alternative to the CAPM as a model of capital market equilibrium. 
APT is based on the premise that a zero return should be earned on an 
'arbitrage portfolio' exhibiting zero systematic risk and requiring no 
new investment. This combined with certain basic assumptions concerning 
investor wealth preferences, capital market efficiency and an assumption 
concerning the stochastic process generating asset returns yields the 
following pricing equation: 
E1 =Ao+ Albil + A2bi2 + ..••• + Akbik 
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Where: Ei = The expected return on asset i, 
Ao = The expected return on an asset with no systematic risk, 
"1 •.. Ak = Factors influencing the returns on assets, which are 
common to all assets under consideration, 
bil···bik =Terms representing the sensitivity of asset returns to 
factors influencing those returns. 
The return on assets is therefore seen as being dependent on a variety of 
factors rather than only the difference between the expected return on 
the market portfolio and the return on the risk free asset as proposed by 
the CAPM. 
APT does not, however, identify the factors influencing security returns 
and the b coefficients are therefore estimated using factor analysis. 
Tests of this nature conducted by Roll and Ross claim either three or 
four such unidentified factors (20). It is therefore possible that these 
factors may be correlated with the dividend payout and to the extent that 
they are unaccounted for through the beta term may be reflected in the 
regression coefficients for the dividend yield variable. This is not 
considered to significantly detract from the value of the conclusion of 
the tests conducted by the writer. 
The situation where alterations in the level of investment are made to 
accommodate predetermined dividend plans deserves attention. The 
interviews conducted by John Lintner documented in Chapter Four, 
indicated that where external financing was limited or unavailable 
financial managers would generally curtail or reschedule available 
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investment alternatives rather than reduce the existing dividend (21). A 
dividend influence on investment planning may therefore be expected. 
The Miller and Modigliani argument of the irrelevance of dividend policy 
in the determination of the value of a firm is based on the premise that 
investment decisions are unaffected by the dividend decision. Should 
such a systematic effect occur the association between dividend and 
investment pol l.cy may be expected to bi.as the . test results. The reason 
for this is that, a change in dividend payout being a zero net present 
value transaction in a perfect capital market, inhi.bits or encourages 
investment decisions which have a non zero net present value. 
Empirical tests of this effect have been carried out on American Stock 
Exchange data by Fama (22). The approach followed involved solving pairs 
of simultaneous cross sectional regression equations with each of the two 
dependent variables, the change in dividend and the change in investinent, 
serving as explanatory variables in the other equation of the pair. 
By examining the t statistics of the regression coefficients and various 
measures of the dispersion of the resultant prediction errors, being the 
difference between the actual dividend or investment change ·and that 
predicted by the cross sectional regression, Fama concluded that dividend 
and investment decisions appear to be independent. 
Fama' s findings contradict the results of Lintner' s interviews unless 
the capital requirements of the firms in Fama's sample had been met and 
no trade off between dividends and investment options had arisen. 
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While the writer is unaware of any similar tests conducted on South 
African data there is no reason to assume that results of local tests 
would not reaffirm Fama's conclusion, particularly in view of abundant 
local investment capital. 
The possible impact of investment decisions on the .dividend payout 
discussed above may result in uncertainty as to whether a noted price 
reaction is due to the investment or dividend change. This is 
essentially a procedural difficulty and does not affect the validity of 
the test. Any noted significant impact of dividend decisions on 
investment decisions would, however, be expected to bias the test results 
, 
for reasons noted above. This would introduce significant empirical 
difficulties and would remove the discussion further from the structure 
of the Miller and Modigliani argument (23). 
Thus in conclusion it may be said that in the absence of tests on South 
Africa data the impact of dividend decisions on investment decisions may 
be a possible, though unlikely, cause of distortion of the test results. 
6.7.2 Share Prices and Returns 
The construction of cross sectional regression studies of the kind 
reported in this thesis results in the testing of the effects of firms' 
betas and other characteri·stics on the returns on their securities. A 
conclusion is then drawn from the results of the test as to whether the 
factors represented by the independent variables are determinants of the 
value of a firm. This conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
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test as a factor may be a determinant of the value of a firm, yet the 
results of a cross sectional regression study may indicate no 
relationship between the two. In the case of the dividend yield variable 
let us suppose that dividend payout positively influences the value of a 
firm and that each level of dividend distribution is associated with a 
particular value of a firm. During a period in which no change in the 
payout policy is experienced the return on a share would be influenced 
only by non dividend factors and accordingly there would be no diffe-rence 
in return between otherwise identical high and low payout shares. 
Furthermore the seven year period over which the cross sectional 
regression study was performed is unlikely to contain many changes in 
I firms' payout policies because these are of a generally permanent 'nature 
having resulted from a formalization of prevlous ad hoc decisions. 
The situation envisaged is, however, likely to be of a temporary nature 
as the continual re-investment of earnings by a low payout firm will 
increase the returns on that share and a difference in return on the 
shares of high and low payout firms will ultimately result in periods 
where no change in dividend policy occurs. Therefore this point is 
unlikely to create a significant distortion of test results. 
6.7.3 Payout Ratios and Dividend Yields 
The topic of the thesis is whether dividend policy, being the proportion 
of earnings distributed as measured by the payout ratio, affects the 
value of a firm. In the above cross sectional regressions dividend yield 
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has been used as a surrogate for the payout ratio. It is possible, 
though unlikely, that the price of a share may be substantially affected 
by any positive or negative dividend preference. Accordingly high and 
low dividend yields may not necessarily represent respectively high and 
low payout ratios. To test for this possibility a chi-squared test was 
employed. The data for the test comprised the same 231 dividend and 
earnings announcements used in the second API test in Chapter Five. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Ho The payout ratios and dividend yields are independent. 
H1 The payout ratios and dividend yields are not independent. 
The following contingency table was drawn up, with the expected 
frequencies shown in brackets in each cell: 
Dividend Yield 
0 - 6.91. 7 .0% - 9.9% 10.0% + Row Totals 
o-.3 9 (6) 6 (9) 6 (6) 21 
.31-.4 21 (18) 24 (25) 18 (20) 63 
Payout .41-.5 19 (22) 36 (30) 21 (24) 76 
Ratio 
.51-.6 15 (12) 16 (17) 12 (14) 43 
.61 + 2 (8) 10 (11) 16 (9) 28 
Column Totals 66 92 73 231 
The test statistic, n2, is calculated as shown below. The terms Oi and 
Ei represent the observed and expected frequencies for each cell and n is 
the total number of observations used. 
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n o2i 
n2 = I - n 
i=l Ei 
n2 = 247.354 - 231 
n2 = 16.354 
The chi-squared statistic at the 5% significance level with 8 degrees of 
freedom is: 
15.507 
As n2 exceeds 15.507 we may reject our null hypothesis ~t the 5% 
confidence level and coriclude that payout ratio and dividend yield are 
not independent. 
Having established the co-movement of the diyidend yield and payout ratio 
the direction of the association is of interest. The table below shows 
on a cumulative basis the percentage of observations in each cell of each 
column in the preceding contingency table: 
o-.3 
.• 31-.4 
Payout .41-.5 
Ratio 
.51-.6 
.61 + 
0 - 6.9 
14 
45 
74 
97 
100 
Dividend Yield (%) 
7.0 - 9.9 
7 
33 
72 
89 
100 
10.0 + 
8 
33 
62 
78 
100 
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By noting the generally decreasing percentages when moving from left to 
right across the table it becomes evident that high payout ratios are 
associated with high dividend yields and vice versa. 
In view of the above it is the writer's opinion that it is acceptable to 
use dividend yield as a proxy for payout ratio in this study. 
6.8 DISCUSSION ON CURRENT DIVIDEND PRACTICE 
In view of the generally accepted irrelevance of dividends under 
conditions approximating perfect capital markets in the normative 
determination of the value of a firm, and the negative dividend 
preference noted during the tests carried out by the writer, the reasons 
for continued dividend payments by the vast majority of companies seem 
unclear. The arguments and tests already documented have assumed that 
the objective of financial management is the maximization of the value of 
the firm. It is possible that other factors prompt the distribution of 
earnings despite any negative impact on the value of a firm. 
Possible reasons for continuing payments may include management's 
perception of a dividend preference on the part of shareholders. In view 
of there being little logical basis for an actual dividend preference, 
systematic irrationality on the part of shareholders appears unlikely. 
Further, incorrect management perception of such a preference over an 
extended period seems improbable. 
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Financial managers may feel that the investment community would interpret 
a reduction in dividends as a sign of poor prospects for the company, 
despite announcements detailing the true reason for the reduction. Any 
initial negative price reaction would, however, be expected to reverse 
once the true reason for the reduction in the dividend had been accepted 
by the investment community. 
Prior to the abolition of South African exchange control restrictions on 
non residents, liberal dividend policies of foreign owned South African 
companies enabled a substantial repatriation of earnings. Whilst this is 
a possible cause of large distributions by foreign owned firms, no reason 
for similar dividend policies by South African firms is implied. 
The tests undertaken by the writer were conducted on data of shares 
traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. These firms, classified as 
public companies for tax purposes, usually constitute the ultimate 
holding company for numerous subsidiaries. To avoid liability for a tax 
on undistributed profits, companies at each level in the group may be 
pressurized into paying dividends to their holding companies. This would 
result in an accumulation of profit in the ultimate holding company who 
in turn would be forced to distribute group earnings. This would, 
however, only occur where the amount of dividends from subsidiary 
companies and other receipts not subject to income tax exceed the 
permissible deductions. The most significant of the allowable items are 
a deduction of the amount expended on plant and ·machinery for use in a 
production process, and in respect of companies classified as public for 
tax purposes, an allowance of 50% of the amount of the before tax total 
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, 
trading surplus attributable to dividends received. This construction of 
the tax law would permit companies with particularly large qualifying 
capital expenditure to avoid tax on undistributed profits and thereby 
eliminate this stimulus for dividend payments. It seems, however, that 
companies undergoing significant expansion which through the available 
capital allowances, presumably renders them temporarily exempt from 
undistributed profits tax, generally continue to pay dividends in 
accordance with their established policy. It therefore appears that 
undistributed profits tax is unlikely to be a significant motivation for 
I 
the payment of dividends. 
A further possible cause of consistent dividend distributions is surplus 
cash resources coupled with a lack of suitable investment options. 
Should this be the case the return on the shares of a firm is increased 
by regular dividend , payments where shareholders are faced with more 
profitable investment options than those available to the company. This 
position is, however, unlikely to occur over an extended period. The 
increase in value results from the elimination of unprofitable 
investments rather than from the distribution of surplus cash resources. 
It may be argued that companies, being aware of their long term cash 
requirements for expansion needs, set a dividend policy which reflects 
their anticipated surplus cash flow. Regular simultaneous dividend 
payments and rights issues are, however, inconsistent with this view. 
Furthermore, while not all firms are likely to have cash resources in 
excess of expected investment requirements, the writer is unaware of any 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange which forego dividend 
payments to provide required investment capital. 
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In view of the above discussion and the negative dividend preference 
noted during the cross sectional regression tests the writer is unable to 
offer an explanation for the current widespread practice by most listed 
companies of relatively generous dividend payments. Consequently it is 
possible that some factor undetected by the writer prompts these 
payments. 
6.9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a cross sectional regression study into the 
effects of dividend policy on the value of a firm. It has further 
analyzed the results and has offered a reconciliation to the existing 
normative position suitably modified to meet the existing tax structure. 
The resultant ·negative dividend preference does not reconcile with the 
payout policies of the vast majority of firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. The writer investigated further possible reasons for 
widespread liberal dividend payments, but could find. none which may 
suggest such a practice. In view of this it was concluded that some 
factor undetected by the writer may influence such payments. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has considered and reviewed previous published arguments and 
empirical work as well as documenting tests conducted by the writer as to 
the effects of dividend policy on the value of a firm. 
The review of published theoretical arguments led to a conclusion that 
under conditions approximating perfect capital markets, the dividend 
policy of a firm is not likely' to affect its value. Due to the diversity 
of market imperfections it is unclear to observers what the aggregate 
effect of such factors on security returns would be. However, in view of 
the difference in the rates of tax applicable to dividend income and 
capital gains one might suspect an overall preference for firms 
distributing a low proportion of their earnings. 
Previous empirical studies, which have been almost exclusively American, 
have yielded conflicting results. However, the most rigorous of these 
have concluded that the dividend yield of a firm does not influence the 
pre-tax return realised on its securities, notwithstanding market 
imperfections. 
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An exploratory investigation by the writer indicated results consistent 
with these overseas analyses. The results of this test, however, yielded 
to the outcome of a more thorough investigation by the writer on 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange data which indicated a positive association 
between before tax return and dividend yield, which implies an overall 
negative dividend preference. 
This test result does not permit a conclusion as to whether the noted 
effect arises from a dividend aversion in a perfect capital markets 
situation or whether it arises from market imperfections. It is 
submitted that the negative dividend preference is likely to have 
resulted from the costs accruing to investors from capital market 
imperfections. The reason for this is that in terms of Miller and 
Modiglianis' now generally accepted dividend irrelevance argument, there 
appears to be no logical basis for the dividend policy of a firm to 
influence its value under conditions of perfect capital markets. As 
discussed in Chapter Six the existing South African taxation structure, 
however, provides a plausible reason for certain investors to prefer 
returns on securities in the form of capital gains rather than 
dividends. For this reason the remaining interpretation of the test 
results will assume that the noted dividend aversion arose from capital 
market imperfections. 
The implication of these findings is that investors are either unable or 
unwilling to reduce the taxation attracted by their dividend receipts 
either by altering their investment decisions so as to give rise to a 
clientele effect or by other means. The reason for this lack of evasive 
action may be that the avenues for the generation of tax deductions from 
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dividend income, which are normally pension and retirement annuity 
contributions and interest payments on borrowings used to finance the 
purchase of securities, are considerably more limited under South African 
tax legislation than under the corresponding American laws. A further 
reason for this may be the relative shortage of scrip and · 1ow payout 
shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange which may prevent investors 
acquiring their desired holdings to effect optimal portfolio 
construction. 
A further implication of the results is that, with other factors held 
constant, tax exempt investors, investors paying similar rates of tax on 
dividend income and capital gains and investors paying a higher rate of 
tax on capital gains than on dividend income stand to gain by biasing 
their portfolios toward more generous payout shares. The amount of the 
prospective gain would need to be carefully evaluated against the 
possible reduction in portfolio diversification. Furthermore, because 
high payout shares appear to offer higher pre-tax returns to compensate 
for the heavier tax, investors paying a higher rate of tax on dividend 
income than on capital gains may on average ignore dividend yield in 
making investment decisions. The precision of the statistical techniques 
employed does not permit the determination of the average discount at 
which the shares of high payout firms sell. In view of this and the 
probable neg! igble profits to be obtained, no conclusions are reached 
regarding the comparison of individual investor's marginal rates of tax 
with this discount factor with a view to identifying profitable trading 
opportunities. 
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In favouring certain payout ratios regard must, however, be had to the 
impact of other market imperfections, such as transaction costs, on 
portfolio returns. 
It was further observed that the overall negative dividend preference 
does not reconcile with the current general practice of regular generous 
dividend payments by the vast majority of companies. Despite a review of 
other factors which may stimulate these payments, none could be found 
which would explain this behaviour. In the absence of some fact-or 
unidentified by the writer it may therefore be said that firms may reduce 
their dividend payout to provide required funding for investment projects 
without it prejudicing the value of the firm. It also implies that on 
average, firms may increase their value by paying lower dividends and as 
a result reducing the amount of new outside capital raised. 
Finally it may be appropriate to end this thesis with a note on aspects 
of the dividend policy controversy offering possible avenues for future 
research. The noted aggregate dividend aversion was, for reasons already 
set out, interpreted as having arisen from capital market imperfections 
rather than from a fundamental distaste for dividends. This result, 
unlike the findings of similar tests on American data, points to the 
existence of unsatisfied investor clienteles. The implication is that 
firms stand to increase their values by amending their dividend policies 
to meet the requirements of these clientele groups. 
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Investigations into the dividend setting process including the factors 
which prompt managements to persist in their existing dividend policies, 
despite evidence of their possible negative impact on the value of firms, 
would be of interest. A further area for useful research would be the 
degree to which investors actually manipulate their investment decisions, 
thus giving rise to a clientele effect, in attempts to neutralise or 
limit their costs arising from market imperfections such as tax 
differentials. Research into the institutional factors prevalent on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange or other reasons as to why investors are 
apparently unwilling or unable to substantially avoid the costs arising 
from market imperfections, would also be of great interest. 
APPENDIX 
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APPENDIX ONE 
SHARES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE YEAR ENDS CONSTITUTING SAMPLES 
FOR API TEST BASED ON PAYOUT RATIOS (TOTAL SAMPLE 248 ITEMS) 
Low Payout 
(91 Items) 
Amie 1979 
Barlows 1974-79 
Bears 1973-79 
Boumat 1973-76 
Carlcor 1976 
Dorbyl 1974-77, 79 
Edgars 1974-76 
Foschini 1976-79 
Frasers 1973-79 
Kohler 1973-77 
Malbak 1973-74, 76-79 
Metkor 1976-77, 79 
M & R 1973-79 
Pick 'n Pay 1974-79 
Protea 1974 
Reunert & Lenz 1974-79 
Seardel 1975-79 . 
Stewarts & Lloyds 1974-76 
Toyota 1973-75, 77-78 
Woolworths 1973-78 
Medium Payout 
(124 Items) 
AECI 1973-75, 78 
Afrox 1975-79 
Amie 1973-78 
Anlo Alpha 1973-76 
Barlows 1973 
Blue Circle 1975-78 
Boumat 1977, 79 
Carlcor 1973-75, 78 
Chemholds 1974-79 
Dorbyl 1973, 78 
Dunlop 1975-78 
Edgar~ 1973, 77-79 
Everite 1973-79 
Fedfood 1974-77 
Fedvolks 1974-77, 79 
Foschini 1973-75 
Gallo 1975-76 
Huletts 1973-76 
Kaapkunene 1975-79 
Kohler 1978 
Malbank 1975 
Metal Box 1973-76 
OK Bazaars 1973-79 
Pep 1973-79 
Pick 'n Pay 1973 
Protea 1973, 75-79 
Rennies 1973-75, 77-78 
Reunert & Lenz 1973 
Sentrachem 1973-79 
Stewarts & Lloyds 1973-77 
Toyota 1976 
Trek 1974, 1976-78 
Woolworths 1979 
High Payout 
(33 Items) 
AECI 1976-77 
Anglo Alpha 1977-78 
Afrox 1973-74 
Blue Circle 1973-74 
Boumat 1978 
Carlcor 1977 
Dunlop 1973-74 
Gallo 1974, 77-78 
Hullets 1977-79 
Kaapkunene 1973-74 
Metal Box 1977-79 
Metkor 1974-75, 78 
Rennies 1976 
Seardel 1973-74 
Stewarts & Lloyds 1978-79 
Trek 1973, 75 
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SHARES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE YEAR ENDS CONSTITUTING SAMPLES 
FOR API TEST BASED ON DIVIDEND YIELD (TOTAL SAMPLE 231 ITEMS) 
Low Dividend 
Yield 
(77 Items) 
AECI 1973, 78 
Afrox 1978-79 
Amie 1973, 78 
Anlo Alpha 1973 
Barlows 1973, 78-79 
Beares 1973, 79 
Blue Circle 1973 
Boumat 1973 
Carlcor 1973-74 
Dorbyl 1973, 79 
Edgars 1973-75, 78-79 
Everite 1973, 75 
Frasers 1973-79 
Gallo 1974-75, 78-79 
Hullets 1973-74 
Kohler 1973, 78 
Malbank 1973 
Metal Box 1973 
M & R 1973, 75 
0 K Bazaars 1973-76 
Pep 1973-74 
Pick 'n Pay 1973-79 
Protea 1973-74 
Rennies 1975 
Reunert&Lenz 73,75,78-79 
Seardel 1973 
Sentrachem 1978-79 
Stewarts & Lloyds 1973,79 
Toyota 1977 
Woolworths 1973-79 
Medium Dividend 
Yield 
(81 Items) 
AECI 1974-77 
Afrox 1973, 75, 77 
Amie 1974-77 
Anlo Alpha 1974 
Barlows 1974-77 
Beares 1974, 78 
Blue Circle 74-75,77-78 
Boumat 1974-75, 79 
Carlcor 1975-76, 78 
Chemholds 1978-79 
Dorbyl 1974-76, 78 
Dunlop 1973, 78 
Edgars 1976-77 
Everite 1974, 76-79 
Fedvolks 1976, 79 
Huletts 1975 
Kohler 1977 
Metal Box 1974-76,78-79 
Metkor 1974-76 
M & R 1974, 78-79 
OK Bazaars 1977-79 
Pep 1975-76, 79 
Protea 1975, 78-79 
Rennies 1977 
Reunert&Lenz 74,76,77 
Seardel 1978-79 
Sentrachem 1974,77 
Stewarts&Lloyds 74, 78 . 
Toyota 1973 
Trek 1973, 76, 78 
High Dividend 
Yield 
(73 Items) 
Afrox 1974, 76 
Anglo Alpha 1975-78 
Beares 1975 - 77 
Blue Circle 1976 
Boumat 1976-78 
Carlcor 1977 
Chemholds 1975-77 
Dorbyl 1977 
Dunlop 1974-77 
Fedvolks 1977 
Gallo 1976-77 
Hullets 1976-79 
Kaapkunene 1973-78 
Kohler 1974-76 
Malbank 1974-79 
Metal Box 1977 
Metkor 1977-79 
M & R 1976-77 
Pep 1977-78 
Protea 1976-77 
Rennies 1974, 76, 78 
Seardel 1974-77 
Sentrachem 1975-76 
Stewarts & Lloyds 1975-77 
Toyota 1974-76, 78 
Trek 1974-75, 77 
Portfolio I 
Aber com 
Boumat 
res 
Mittcot 
Russells 
Tiger 
Rembeh 
Bea res 
Cur fin 
Ellerines 
Placor 
Rennies 
Sterns 
Portfolio IV 
AECI 
Fedvolks 
LTA 
Lamber ts 
Blue Circ 
S & L 
Toyota 
Hullet 
Uni sec 
Wesco 
Portfolio VII 
Amie 
Afrox 
A sea 
Dorbyl 
CNA 
Frasers 
Tongaat 
Hi veld 
Metkor 
W Barends 
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CONSTITUENT SHARES FOR PORTFOLIOS 
USED IN CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION STUDY 
Portfolio II 
ATI 
Kaapkun 
M & R 
SAB 
Afcol 
McCarthy 
SAPP I 
Relilgro 
Woolworths 
Tedelex 
Portfolio V 
Bar lows 
Bonuskor 
Protea 
Nat Trading 
W Hunt 
OK 
Safrnarine 
Pep 
S A Druggists 
Trek 
Portfolio VIII 
Halbak 
Gen tyre 
Reunert & Lenz 
Unsteel 
Afr Pers 
Edgars 
Met Cash 
Kanhym 
Seardel 
Asseng 
Portfolio III 
Cal an 
Grinaker 
Senchem 
W & A 
Premier 
Romatex 
Bonmore 
Ed con 
L H Marth 
Nampak 
Portfolio VI 
Marn prod 
PG 
Dunlop 
Metal Box 
Steelmetals 
Greatermans 
Gresham 
Le fie 
Carlcor 
Pick 'n Pay 
Portfolio IX 
Rex Truef orm 
SWA Fish 
Adcock 
Curries 
Dunswart 
I & J 
Kohler 
Cadswep 
Otis 
Triomf 
Portfolio X 
Anglo Alpha 
Chemhold 
Everite 
Ind & Comm 
Aberdare 
Af Cable 
Claude Neon 
Cullinan 
Scots 
Argus 
Foschini 
Gallo 
Gubbings 
Truworths 
- 164 -
CONSTITUENT SHARES FOR PORTFOLIOS 
USED IN CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION STUDY 
- 165 -
REFERENCES 
Affleck-Graves, J.F., 'The Application of Multivariate Statistical 
Techniques in the Analysis of Stock Market Data', Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1977. As reported in Knight (1983). 
Affleck-Graves, J.F., Money, A.H., 'A Note on the Random Walk Model and 
South African Share Prices', The South African Journal of Economics. 
Vol. 43, 1974. pp 382 - 388. 
Beaver, W.H., 'Market Efficiency', The Accounting Review. January 1981. 
pp 23 - 37. 
Benishay, H., 'Variability in Earnings 
Equities', The American Economic Review. 
Price Ratios of Corporate 
No. 1, 1961. pp 81 - 94. 
Black, F., 
Policy on 
Economics. 
Scholes, M., 'The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend 
Common Stock Prices and Returns', Journal of Financial 
May 1974. pp l - 22. 
Blume, M.E., 'Portfolio Theory: A Step Toward its Practical Application', 
Journal of Business. April 1970. pp 152 - 173. 
Blume, M. E., 'Stock Re turns and Dividend Yields: Some more Evidence' , 
Review of Economics and Statistics. November 1980. pp 567 - 577. 
Brealey, R., Myers, S., Principles of Corporate Finance. 
McGraw Hill, 1981. 
New York: 
Brennan, M., 'Taxes, 
National Tax Journal. 
Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy', 
December 1970. pp 417 - 427. 
Brennan, M., 'A Note on Dividend Irrelevance and the Gordon Valuation 
Model', Journal of Finance. December 1971. pp 1115 - 1121. 
Copeland, T .E., 
Second Edition. 
Weston, J .F., Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 
Los Angeles: Addison Wesley, 1982. 
Elton, E .J., Gruber, M.J., 'Marginal Stockholders' Tax Rates and the 
Clientele Effect'. Review of Economics and Statistics. February 1970. 
pp 68 - 74. 
Fama, E., 'The Empirical Relationships between the 
Investment Decisions of Firms', American Economic Review. 
304 - 318. 
Dividend and 
June 1974. pp 
Fama, E., Foundations of Finance. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 
Fama, E., Babiak, H., 'Dividend Policy: 
of the American Statistical Association. 
An Empirical Analysis'. Journal 
December 1968. pp 1132 - 1161. 
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., Roll, R., 'The Adjustment of Stock 
Prices to New Information', International Economic Review. February 1969. 
pp l - 21. 
Fama, E., MacBeth, J.U., 'Risk Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests', 
Journal of Political Economy. May/June 1973. pp 607 - 636. 
7 
<..> 
- 166 -
Friend, I., Puckett, M., Dividends and Stock Prices', 
Economic Review. September 1964. pp 656 - 682. 
Gordon, M., 'Dividends, Earnings and Stock Prices', Review 
and Statistics. May 1959. pp 99 - 105. 
American 
of Economic ) 
(. 
Gordon, M., 'The Savings, Investment and Valuation of A Corporation', 
Review of Economics and Statistics. February 1962. pp 37 - 51. 
Gordon, 
Finance. 
M., 'Optimal Investment 
May 1963. pp 264 - 272. 
and Financing Policy', Journal of 
'On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Grossman, s., 
Traders Have 
pp 573 - 585. 
Diverse Information', Journal of Finance. May 1976. 
Hawawini, G.A., 
Risk and Return 
and Accounting. 
Michel, P.A., Viallet, C.J., 'An Assessment of the 
of French Common Stocks', Journal of Business Finance 
1983. pp 333 - 350. 
Higgins, R., 'The Corporate Dividend - Saving Decision', Journal of '7 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis. March 1972. pp 1527 - 1541. ~ 
Knight, R.F., 'The Association Between Published Accounting Data and the 
Behaviour of Share Prices', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 1983. 
Knight, R.F., Affleck-Graves, J.F., 'The Information content of Dividends 
incremental to the Information content of Earnings: The South African 
Experience 1 , Unpublished Research Paper, The University of Cape Town, 
January 1984. 
Lintner, J., 'Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, 
Retained Earnings and Taxes', American Economic Review. May 1956. 
pp 97 - 113. 
Lintner, J., 'Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth Under Uncertainty', 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. February 1964. pp 49 - 95. 
Litzenberger, R., Ramaswamy, K., 'The Effect of Personal Taxes and 
Dividends on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence', 
Journal of Financial Economics. June 1979. pp 163 - 196. 
Long, J .Jr., 'Efficient Portfolio Choice with Differential Taxation of 
Dividends and Capital Gains', Journal of Financial Economics. 
August 1977. pp 25 - 54. 
Long, J.Jr., 
to Consider', 
pp 235 - 264. 
'The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends: A 
Journal of Financial Economics. June/September 
Case 
1978. 
Markowitz, 
Investment. 
H.M., Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 
.. 
- 167 -
Mayers, D., Rice, E., 'Measuring Portfolio Performance and the Empirical 
Content of Asset Pricing Models', Journal of Financial Economics. March 
1979. pp 3 - 28. 
Miller, M., Modigliani, F., 'Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation 
of Shares', Journal of Business. October 1961. pp 411 - 433. 
Miller, M., 
Economics. 
Scholes, M. , 
December 1978. 
'Dividends and Taxes' , 
pp 333 - 364. 
Journal of Financial 
Pettit, R.R., 'Taxes, Transaction Costs and the Clientele Effect of 
Dividends', Journal of Financial Economics. December 1977. pp 419 - 436. 
Reinganum, M., 'The Arbitrage Pricing Theory: Some Empirical Results', 
The Journal of Finance. May 1981 b. pp 313 - 321. 
Robichek, A.A., Meyers, S.L., Optimal Financing Decisions. 
Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice Hall, 1965. 
Roll, R., 'A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests', Journal of 
Financial Economics. March 1977. pp 129 - 176. 
Roll, R., 
Economics. 
'A Reply to Mayers and Rice 
July 1979. pp 391 - 399. 
(1979)'' Journal of Financial 
Rosenberg, B., Marathe, V., 
Hypothesis', Research in Finance. 
'Tests of the 
January 1979. 
Capital Asset 
pp 115 - 223. 
Pricing 
Ross, S.A., 'The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing', Journal of 
Economic Theory. December 1976. pp 343 - 362. 
Schallheim, J., De Magistris, 
Parameters', Financial Management. 
R., 'New Estimates of the Market 
Autumn 1980. pp 60 - 68. 
Seneque, P.J.C., Gourley, B.M., 'Dividend Policy and Practice in South 
Africa', The Investment Analysts Journal. June 1983. pp 35 - 39. 
Sharpe, W.F., 'Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under 
Conditions of Risk', Journal of Finance. September 1964. pp 425 - 442. 
Sunder, s., 'Relationship Between Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: 
Problems of Measurement and Some Empirical Evidience', Empirical 
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies. 1973. pp 1 - 46. 
Visser, F., Affleck-Graves, J.F., ·'A Factor Analysis of Shares Listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange', Technical Report No. STM 10, The 
Department of Mathematical Statistics, University of Cape Town. 1982. As 
reported in Knight (1983). 
Walter, J.E., 'Dividend Policies and Common Stock Prices', Journal of 
Finance. March 1956. pp 29 - 41. 
Watts, R., 'The Information Content of Dividends', Journal of Business. 
April 1973. pp 191 - 211. 
3 0 APR 1986 
